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In this dissertation we study several key issues faced by firms while introducing
new products to market. The first essay looks at product rollovers: introduction of
a new product generation while phasing out the old one. We study the strategic
decision of dual vs. single roll jointly with operational decisions of inventory and
pricing during this transitional period. Our results confirm previous findings and
uncover the role and interaction of several parameters that were not examined before.
In the second essay, we investigate the role of information provision and return
policies in the consumer purchasing behavior and on the overall market outcome.
We build a novel model of consumer learning, and we attain significant analytical
findings without making any distributional assumptions. We then fully study the
joint optimization problem analytically under uniform valuations.
In the third essay, we study competition in the framework described in the
second essay and we identify the potential Nash equilibria and associated conditions.
Our findings demonstrate the effect of competition on return policy and information
provision decisions and provide insight on some real-life observations.
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Firms, particularly in high-tech markets, increasingly see new product introduction
as a tool to gain or maintain market share, to sustain growth, and to create profits.
Accordingly, firms are under constant pressure for faster time-to-market and shorter
life cycles for many products, and face the challenges of managing these. In addi-
tion to traditional new product development issues such as cost, quality, and time-
to-market trade-offs, more frequent product introductions result in more frequent
product rollovers—the process of phasing out the old generation while introducing
the new to the market. Therefore, successful product introduction requires success-
ful management of product rollovers, which involves several interrelated decisions
including those on timing, pricing, preannouncing, and controlling inventory.
There are two basic product rollover timing strategies available to a firm. In a
dual product rollover (dual roll), the old generation remains in the market for some
time after the launch of the new; in a single product rollover (single roll), the old
generation is discontinued as soon as the new generation arrives (Billington et al.
1998). Both of these strategies have implications on the operational decisions that
a firm must make. In a single roll, sharp price markdowns may be necessary to
clear excess inventory of the old product. Under a dual roll, the old product retards
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the diffusion of the new product into the market; this may be undesirable as new
products typically command higher margins.
There are numerous real-life examples attesting to the interplay and conse-
quences of inventory, pricing, and timing decisions. Intel had scheduled the launch
of its X48 chipset for PC motherboards in January 2008, when the X38 chipset
would be replaced in the high-end market. However, the launch was delayed for
two months due to pressure from the world’s largest motherboard manufacturer,
ASUSTEK, on the grounds that it had too much inventory of X38-based parts that
were marginally inferior to X48-based parts. Other manufacturers who had no in-
ventory problems had to wait until March 2008 although they were ready for launch
in January. Another motherboard manufacturer, ASRock, was first to launch its
P43-based motherboards to the mainstream market in June 2008, while all other
manufacturers were struggling with their inventory of older P35-based parts even
with significant price cuts. In November 2007, AMD introduced deep price cuts
for its older Athlon based processors and rushed its long-awaited, quad-core Phe-
nom processors to the market before the holiday season, even though the processors
had a fault which caused unexpected crashes. Further, AMD was unable to meet
the demand at launch and prices remained higher than Intel’s competing quad-core
processors that already greatly dominated the market and performed better. In the
end, although the fault was corrected by March 2008, the highly anticipated Phenom
architecture failed to capture the market share expected (various online technology
news sources).
Despite their importance, product rollovers are commonly mismanaged in
2
practice, while understudied in the academic literature. A study of 126 U.S. durable
goods firms reports that 40% of new products failed after launch (Ettlie 1993), one
possible reason being mismanaged rollovers such as the previous examples. Another
study by Greenley and Bayus (1994) indicates that most U.S. and U.K. firms do
not have a formal decision process for product rollovers. Not only is there just a
handful of scholarly papers that discuss product rollover strategies, but there is lit-
tle consensus among them on what rollover strategy to use under what condition.
Saunders and Jobber (1994) identify 11 rollover strategies, which they call “phas-
ing.” They survey U.S. and U.K. managers and find that some sort of dual roll was
used in slightly more than half of them. Billington et al. (1998) and Erhun et al.
(2007) present managerial papers that provide understanding and guidelines derived
from intuition and hands-on experience, but no formal treatment of the problem.
While Billington et al. (1998) associate single (dual) roll with low (high) supply and
demand risk, Erhun et al. (2007) state that oftentimes the industry dictates this
decision and that dual roll is an industry standard for high-tech markets even with
low supply and demand risks. The only two papers to our knowledge that attempt
a formal analysis of product rollovers are Levinthal and Purohit (1989) and Lim and
Tang (2006), but neither model incorporates diffusion, a key attribute of high-tech
markets. Although they use different terminology, Levinthal and Purohit (1989)
consider three alternative strategies: single roll, dual roll, and dual roll with buy-
back of the old generation. They find that single roll is always better than dual roll,
and that single roll is better than dual roll with buy-backs for modest performance
improvements of the new product over the old. Contrast this finding with the rec-
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ommendation of Billington et al. (1998), who suggest that a large technological gap
between generations (large product risk) favors dual roll. Lim and Tang (2006) find
that dual roll is optimal when marginal costs across generations are similar, using a
linear deterministic demand structure. A few other authors (Carrillo 2005, Li and
Gao 2008, Druehl et al. 2009) simply assume a particular rollover strategy in their
models, regardless of the environment.
1.1.1 Contribution of This Study
We are not aware of an academic study that provides an integrated, formal treatment
of product rollovers that incorporates the dynamics discussed above; we address this
gap using a comprehensive model of product rollovers that includes pricing, inven-
tory, product diffusion, and new product preannouncement (before introduction).
More specifically, our key contribution in this essay is to identify the conditions
under which a particular rollover strategy (single vs. dual) is preferred, and which
factors play the most significant role in this strategy decision. We describe our
approach below.
We focus on successive improved generations of a single product by a firm such
as ASUSTEK. The fact that high-tech products are often introduced on a relatively
regular basis supports our model; this notion of (time) pacing of product updates
may also improve a firm’s product development capability (Eisenhardt and Brown
1998). For example, the pacemaker company Medtronics has successfully used a
time-pacing strategy (Christensen 1997). We adapt the multi-generation diffusion
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process by Norton and Bass (1987) to model the arrival process of potential cus-
tomers through the life-cycle of a product. Here, however, an arriving customer
buys the product if the price is lower than her reservation price. In addition, the
firm preannounces the new product sometime before its launch and we study dif-
ferent levels of the market’s responsiveness to preannouncements to account for the
potential changes in consumer purchasing behavior due to the preannouncement.
The firm first adopts a product rollover strategy, single or dual roll, then decides
on the quantity for the final build of the old product and the price paths for both
products.
We find that the decision between dual and single roll is not trivial and depends
on a number of (exogenous) factors considered in our model. Specifically, dual roll
is preferred to single roll if (i) the time between product introductions is short,
(ii) the preannouncement occurs at the later stages of the life-cycle, (iii) the old
product keeps more of its value at the end-of-life, (iv) the market is less responsive
to preannouncements, (v) the new product is expected to have a slower market
diffusion, and/or (vi) performance improvement between the new and old products
is smaller 1. We also find that the optimal price paths closely follow customer
reservation prices over time.
In the next section, we show how our work relates to and differs from the
existing literature. We then present our model and its analytical solutions in Section
1Although some of these factors, such as timing of preannouncement, are in reality not exoge-
nous but decided on by the seller, we treat them as exogenous for tractability and to focus on the
two rollover strategies, and we perform a sensitivity analysis to study their impact on profit.
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1.3, and Section 1.4, a comprehensive numerical analysis of the factors impacting
the optimal rollover strategy. We conclude in Section 1.5.
1.2 Related Literature
We bring together elements from a diverse literature, incorporating rollover strate-
gies, diffusion of innovations (Norton and Bass 1987, Bass and Bass 2004), prean-
nouncements (Farrell and Saloner 1986, Manceau et al. 2002, Su and Rao 2008), dy-
namic pricing (Bitran and Mondschein 1997, Smith and Achabal 1998, Elmaghraby
and Keskinocak 2003), and inventory management at the end of life (Cattani and
Souza 2003).
A stream of research has considered the interaction of diffusion and new prod-
uct generations. Savin and Terwiesch (2005) model the diffusion effects in a duopoly
and find the optimal launch time. Our model differs from theirs in that we study
a multi-generation scenario and the implications of single versus dual roll strate-
gies. Earlier, Wilson and Norton (1989) determined the optimal time to introduce a
product line extension; thus, the rollover strategy is not relevant. They found that
the second product should generally be introduced immediately or not at all, but ig-
nored price and inventory considerations. Mahajan and Muller (1996) extended this
result in a multi-generational scenario where they found that a monopolist should
introduce the next generation either early in the first product’s life cycle, or wait
until it has reached maturity (i.e., sales have peaked).
Pricing of a product over its life-cycle has been addressed by a large number of
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researchers. Several have focused on finding an optimal pricing pattern, assuming
the sales follow the Bass (1969) model (e.g., Robinson and Lakhani 1975, Bass 1980,
Dolan and Jeuland 1981, Kalish 1983, Horsky 1990). However, these studies found
a pricing pattern that follows the sales growth curve, which is not supported by
empirical data (Krishnan et al. 1999). In more recent work, Krishnan et al. (1999)
present a model extending the Generalized Bass Model (Bass et al. 1994), to find an
optimal price path. None of these papers study pricing considering the next product
generation.
The sequence and timing of new product introductions for two or more prod-
ucts with differing quality levels has been considered as a way to alleviate cannibal-
ism (Moorthy and Png 1992, Chen and Yu 2002, Battacharya et al. 2003, Krishnan
and Zhu 2006). Dhebar (1994) examines the pricing and quality level decisions for a
monopolist introducing two generations of products at fixed times. He finds that the
firm may limit the quality (or features) offered in each generation to minimize con-
sumer regret. In our setting, the effects of cannibalization are modeled, but sequence
is not considered, and higher quality is always valued more by the customers.
A successful rollover requires inventory management for a product (generation
1) at the end of its life. A related stream of literature focuses on determining the
optimal size of a “final buy” (or “final build”) for a product nearing the end of its
life when there is uncertain demand (Teunter and Fortuin 1998, Cattani and Souza
2003). Like this stream of research, we also determine the optimal size of the final
build for generation 1, which in our model is being phased out for introduction
of generation 2. Unlike this stream of research, our model considers the demand
7
interactions – cannibalization – between old and new generations.
In summary, although there is a significant body of research analyzing prod-
uct introduction management, modeling life-cycle demand, and considering pricing
implications, no single work demonstrates the role and interaction of these in the
product rollover process. Our contribution to the literature is to investigate all




Consider an infinite horizon where, every τ periods, a firm introduces successive new
generations of a certain product, in order to replace the existing old generation. In
such a setting, a transition takes place between two consecutive product generations
every τ periods; our model focuses on one product rollover that is representative of
this repetitive process. The notation used in this essay is explained in Table 1.1.
Let t = 0 be the time when generation 1 is introduced (made available) to the
market; accordingly, generation 2 is introduced at t = τ . Throughout the essay, the
following terms are used interchangeably: generation 1 (2), product 1 (2), and old
(new) product. The planning horizon starts at t = ατ , α ∈ (0, 1), which marks the
time when i) generation 2 is preannounced, and ii) the firm produces a final build of
generation 1 and starts concentrating her production capabilities into assuring that




i Index for product (generation); i = 1, 2
j Index for rollover strategy; j = S (single); j = D (dual)
τ Time between product introductions
ατ Time of final build after launch of a product; 0 < α < 1
T j Time that product 1 is taken out of the market for rollover strategy j
Ω The performance of the old generation
γ Performance improvement per generation
h(γ) Logit probability that an old product customer instead buys the new
λji (t) Arrival rate of customers for product i under rollover strategy j at time t
Mi Cumulative market potential with generation i
mi Incremental market potential for generation i
F j(t) Fraction of market potential achieved at time t under rollover strategy j
p Coefficient of innovation for diffusion process
q Coefficient of imitation for diffusion process
φ Customer responsiveness to preannouncements; φ ∈ (0,∞)
pi(t) Price of product i at time t (control variable)
Git(·) Cumulative probability function of reservation price for product i at time t
Ḡit 1−Git
git(·) Probability density function of reservation price for product i at time t
I(t) Inventory of product 1 at time t
I0 Size of final build for product 1 at start of planning horizon (I0 = I(ατ))
cp Unit production cost
ch Unit holding cost per period
cs Unit salvage value (for leftover inventory)
δ Continuous time discount rate
N(·) Non-stationary Poisson process
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two event times is possible; however, this can be effectively achieved by appropriately
modifying the market responsiveness parameter, as seen later. A final build at
t = ατ means that there will be no further inventory replenishments for generation
1. This may occur because, for instance, the same production facility needs to
be reconfigured to produce the new product. The end of the planning horizon is
t = (1 + α)τ when generation 3 is announced and a final build for generation 2 is
due. The time when generation 1 is taken out of the market is T j, j ∈ {S,D},
where T S = τ for the single roll, and TD = (1 + α)τ for the dual roll (that is, in
a dual roll, generation i is taken out of the market at the time generation i + 2 is
announced). Figure 1.1 depicts the sequence of events in our model.
Seller introduces
product 1





Seller pre-announces product 2;




Seller pre-announces product 3; 
Final build of product 2;
Planning horizon ends
 1
Sales horizon of product 1
in dual roll
Sales horizon of 
product 2
Figure 1.1: Planning horizon and sequence of events.
We assume that each new generation brings performance improvements over
the old one, some of which are observable by the end users. Examples include new
and/or enhanced features, better compatibility, and better environmental proper-
ties. Let Ω denote the performance (a sum of performance attributes) of the old
generation. Then, the performance of the new generation is (1 + γ)Ω, where γ > 0
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is the performance improvement parameter.
1.3.2 Demand Process
The preannouncement of generation 2 at t = ατ , α ∈ (0, 1)—some time after the
introduction of generation 1—starts a diffusion of “awareness” of the new product.
People first become aware of the new generation even before it is launched, due
to the preannouncement. They then decide to “adopt” (to become a “potential
customer” for) the new generation; this decision is made based on the performance
of generation 2 vis-a-vis that of generation 1. If a customer is a potential customer of
generation 2, then she becomes an actual customer—buys product 2—when product
2 is available (and that occurs only after product 2 is launched at t = τ) and if the
product’s price is below her reservation price (maximum willingness-to-pay for the
product at that time). We elaborate on this process below.
After generation 2 is preannounced, potential generation 1 customers eventu-
ally become aware of generation 2. Speed of this pre-launch information diffusion
process depends on the “responsiveness” of the customer population to preannounce-
ments (Farrell and Saloner 1986, Manceau et al. 2002, Su and Rao 2008). That is, if
customers are fully responsive, then the diffusion of awareness (again, not of sales,
as the product is not yet available) starts as if the product had been released; the
diffusion of awareness is slower if customers are less responsive to preannounce-
ments; finally, the diffusion of awareness does not start until the product is released
if customers are not responsive. Once customers become aware of generation 2, they
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decide whether to adopt the new generation by comparing the new generation’s per-
formance relative to that of the old one. The higher the performance of the new
generation relative to the old one, the higher the likelihood of a person to adopt the
new product. This choice between generation 1 and 2 is modeled through the Logit
model of discrete choice with a logarithmic utility function. Under this model, when
a potential customer of the old generation becomes aware of the new generation, the
probability that she adopts the new generation (i.e., becomes a potential customer
for the new generation) is h(γ) = (1 + γ)/(2 + γ). See Appendix A for a derivation
of this formula.
We model the diffusion of awareness of the new generation through the Norton
and Bass model (Norton and Bass 1987), which we refer to as N&B, as follows. In
N&B, a new generation of an existing technology replaces the old generation through
a process of adoption and substitution; this process continues for subsequent gen-
erations. In our model, the arrival process of potential customers to online and/or
physical stores is described by a process similar to N&B, appropriately modified to
take into account the impact of preannouncement on the diffusion of awareness of
the new generation, and the likelihood of adoption h(γ) by potential customers of
the old generation who become aware of the new generation before its launch date.
This is done as follows. Denoting the cumulative and incremental market potentials
for generation i with Mi and mi, respectively, the potential customer arrival rate





j(t) [1− h(γ)F j(t− τ)] , for t ∈ [0, T j]
0, otherwise,
(1.1)
with the fraction of potential customers for a generation at time t and rollover
strategy j, F j(t), given by
F j(t) =









, if 0 < t < T j
1, if t ≥ T j,
(1.2)
where FA(·) (Manceau et al. 2002) is given by
FA(t) =





















] , if − (1− α)τ < t ≤ 0.
(1.3)
Equation (1.1) is similar to N&B except for the multiplier h(γ), such that
h(γ)F j(t − τ) is the fraction of potential customers of generation 1 who switch
to generation 2 due to its performance improvement. The fraction of potential
customers for a generation at time t, F j(t), is higher than or equal to the cor-
responding F (t) in N&B due to the preannouncement effect; p and q are N&B’s
coefficients of innovation and imitation, respectively. In N&B, F (t) = 0 ∀ t ≤ 0,
but here, there is adoption of the new generation after preannouncement (but be-
fore introduction time, i.e., for t ≤ 0), which is denoted by FA(t). The parameter
φ ∈ (0,∞) represents the responsiveness of customers to preannouncements. If
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φ → 0, then customers are not responsive to preannouncements, and the diffusion
process approaches N&B starting at t = 0. If, however, φ → ∞, then customers
are fully responsive to preannouncements, and (1.2) is equivalent to N&B starting
at t = −(1 − α)τ , the announcement of generation 1. Note that the time argu-
ment in Equation (1.3) is negative as FA(·) represents the diffusion process due to
preannouncement before a generation is introduced; t ≤ 0.





j(t− τ), for t ∈ (τ, (1 + α)τ ]
0, otherwise.
(1.4)
We further assume that market potentials follow a growth pattern according
to the performance improvement: mi = γMi−1 and Mi = Mi−1 + mi, where mi
(Mi) is the incremental (cumulative) market potential for generation i. Figure 1.2
demonstrates potential customer arrival intensities during the planning horizon for
p + q = 0.3, q/p = 25, M0 = 100, γ = 0.5, τ = 20, α = 0.5, and φ = 6.275. Note
that the arrival rate for generation 1 is independent of the rollover strategy used
for t ≤ τ , but for t ≥ τ , λS1 (t) = 0. Because the market is somewhat responsive
to preannouncements (φ > 0), the arrival rate for generation 2 at the time of its
introduction at τ is larger than 0 (zero would be the traditional diffusion pattern
of N&B). We also have λS2 (t) > λ
D
2 (t) because there is some cannibalization of
generation 2 by generation 1 in a dual roll. In Figure 1.3, the effect of φ is illustrated
using p+ q = 0.3, q/p = 25, M0 = 100, γ = 0.5, τ = 20, and α = 0.5. Note that for
φ → 0, the market is unresponsive to preannouncements, and thus the diffusion of
generation 2 only starts when it is actually introduced at t = τ . For φ → ∞, the
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market is fully responsive to preannouncements, and diffusion starts immediately
after preannouncement at ατ , as if generation 2 had been introduced at that time.
ατ τ (1 + α)τ
M1
M2













Dual Roll, gen. 1
Dual Roll, gen. 2
Single Roll, gen. 1
Single Roll, gen. 2
Figure 1.2: Customer arrival intensities for each rollover strategy.
As stated before, the actual sales rate of generation i at time t depends on the
arrival rate of potential customers λji (t), price pi(t) of product i, and the distribution
of customer reservation prices. Price will be discussed in the next section. Customers
of product i at time t have reservation prices distributed according to the cumulative
distribution function (cdf) Git(·), and probability density function (pdf) git(·). We
assume that Git(·) has the shape of a Weibull distribution, as this distribution is
able to capture a variety of consumer behavior and has been used previously in
the literature (Bitran and Mondschein 1997). The Weibull distribution has two
parameters; the mean is mainly determined by the scale parameter β, and the
variance by both β and the shape parameter k. For illustration, Figure 1.4 plots the
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reservation price distribution git(·) for different shape and scale parameters. The
firm knows the distributions for both products at any time; this knowledge feature
is common in most marketing and operations models of consumer behavior.
ατ = 10 τ = 20 (1+ α)τ = 30
M1
M2












φ→ ∞, gen. 1
φ→ ∞, gen. 2
φ= 6.275, gen. 1
φ= 6.275, gen. 2
φ→ 0, gen. 1
φ→ 0, gen. 2
Figure 1.3: Customer arrival intensities for different responsiveness parameters.
We state the assumptions underlying the demand process in this essay as
follows; we comment on these assumptions later in Section 1.5:
(i) There are no explicit competing firms or products or expectation of any.
(ii) Product generations interact only through the arrival process described above.
Once a customer makes a decision to adopt the new generation, her actual
purchase decision is based on the price of the new generation; she does not
re-evaluate her decision (i.e., consider the old generation) if the price of the
new generation is higher than her reservation price.
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β = 10, k = 10.8
β = 10, k = 3.6β = 8, k = 3.6
β = 10, k = 1.2
β = 5, k = 3.6
Figure 1.4: Weibull densities with different shape and scale parameters.
(iii) At any time, there are at most two product generations in the market.
(iv) Prices have no influence on the customer arrival processes, although they im-
pact actual sales, because an arriving customer only buys if the price is below
her reservation price. Thus, increasing prices decreases sales monotonically.
(v) Customers are neither price strategic nor do they expect a new generation to
be introduced before its announcement.
1.3.3 Optimization Problem
At the start of the planning horizon, the firm decides on the inventory level for prod-
uct 1, denoted by I0 = I(ατ), and the price paths for both products, pi(t), i = 1, 2,
throughout the horizon such that expected discounted profits are maximized. We
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assume a unit production cost, cp, that is constant over time and across genera-
tions. For product 1, there is a constant holding cost of ch per unit per time, and
a constant unit salvage value cs < cp for any remaining inventory at time T
j. We
assume that the firm uses a continuous review, instantaneous replenishment inven-
tory control policy for product 2; therefore, there are no holding costs and no lost
sales. We find that the inventory control policy for product 2 does not significantly
affect the comparison of rollover strategies, enabling us to make this simplifying
assumption. We have also analyzed periodic review order-up-to policies and found
that the single vs. dual roll comparison was not significantly affected by the num-
ber of inventory reviews. This result is primarily driven by our assumption that
the firm faces no supply constraints for the new generation. Although some firms
face capacity constraints for new products, particularly immediately after introduc-
tion if the product is popular, our model does not capture this effect, and we leave
investigation of supply constraints for future research.
The discount rate is δ and a non-stationary Poisson process, with time-depend-
ent arrival intensity λji (t) as its argument, is denoted by N(·). The profit maximiza-
tion problem depends on the rollover strategy and is solved separately for each
strategy. Given the underlying diffusion dynamics, the arrival processes for the two
generations are independent from each other; there are no price or inventory inter-
actions between the two arrival processes. Thus, for each strategy, we can partition
the optimization problem into separate problems for each product.
By selecting a rollover strategy j ∈ {S,D}, the firm faces the following
continuous-time stochastic optimization problem for product 1, where Ḡit = 1−Git
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I(T j) > 0











Note that I(t) describes the inventory remaining at time t and we require that
inventory is nonnegative when the product is pulled from the market. The first term
of the expectation is price times sales rate, the second and third terms account for
salvage and holding costs, respectively, and the last is the cost of final build.














The optimal price path for product 2 can be determined in a straightforward manner,
as shown in Proposition 1 below.





This price path is unique if and only if (Ḡ2t)
2
g2t
is a decreasing function of p2(t), ∀t.
Proof See Appendix A.
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Proposition 1 shows that the price for generation 2 at any point in time depends
simply on the production cost and the consumer’s reservation price distribution at
that time. Due to Assumption 2 in the previous section, there is no interaction with
generation 1 customers. Inventory availability also does not affect price due to the
assumptions on reservation prices and inventory replenishment. If we assume that
G2t(·) = G2(·) ∀t, then p2(t) will be constant.
The optimization problem (1.5) for product 1 is not tractable due to its
stochastic nature and the existence of multiple decision variables. Proposition 2
below shows that the deterministic version of this problem is asymptotically opti-
mal as arrival intensities grow large.
Proposition 2 Solution to the following deterministic optimal control problem is
















I(T j) > 0
dI(t)
dt


















and is unique if and only if (Ḡ1t)
2
g1t
is a decreasing function of p1(t), ∀t.






Proof See Appendix A.
Note that the optimal price path for product 1 closely follows the reservation
price curve, very similarly to the price path for product 2. The only difference is
that the price for product 1 at any time t also accounts for the holding cost of
inventory incurred between ατ and t. If the reservation price curve for product 1 is
decreasing in t, which is a reasonable scenario considering that the product is ending
its life, then the optimal price will also decrease in t accordingly. Because we find
the solution to the asymptotically optimal deterministic problem, the final build
inventory level I0 will be exactly sufficient to satisfy all demand between [ατ, T
j]
and there will be no leftover inventory.
To find a price path, one needs to solve equations (1.7) and (1.9) for each time
point t. Given the Weibull distributions for Git, there are no closed form solutions for
pi(t). Numerically, however, this is straightforward: discretize the planning horizon,
and solve (1.7) and (1.9), through any line-search algorithm, for each discrete t. We
study the problem numerically in the next section.
1.4 Comparison of Rollover Strategies: Numerical Analysis
To develop further insight into the choice of rollover strategy, we turn to numerical
analysis and run a full-factorial experimental design with eight model parameters
at three levels each (low, medium and high). This allows us to better understand
under which conditions of parameter values a particular rollover strategy is preferred,
based on maximal profits resulting from the optimization procedure described in
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Section 1.3. We now describe our experiment.
1.4.1 Parameters Describing the Planning Horizon: τ , α
The planning horizon is [ατ, (1 + α)τ ]; however, sales horizons for the two products
differ as shown in Figure 1.1. For the old product, length of the sales horizon (during
the planning horizon) for single roll is (1−α)τ , while that for dual roll is τ . For the
new product, length of the sales horizon does not depend on the rollover strategy
and is always equal to ατ . Therefore, given τ , a small (large) α indicates a long
(short) sales horizon for the old product under single roll. Consequently, we expect
dual roll to result in higher average profits compared to single roll as α increases.
The effect of τ , however, is not as straightforward. A longer time horizon means
higher total sales; however, price may decrease more and there may be downward
substitution, negatively affecting the profit rate. In the following numerical studies,
the time unit is months, and we use (10, 20, 30) months for τ ; these are typical
times between product introductions in the high tech industry (Druehl et al. 2009).
Given that 0 < α < 1, we use α ∈ {0.3, 0.5, 0.7} in order to capture scenarios where
the final build decision occurs very early in the life-cycle (α = 0.3) to late in the
life-cycle (α = 0.7), reflecting, for example, different manufacturing lead times.
1.4.2 Parameters Describing the Arrival Process: p, q, θ, γ, M0
Recall the arrival process consists of a non-stationary Poisson process whose mean
depends on the diffusion process. First, noting that the initial market size is just
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a scale parameter, we set M0 = 100. For the Bass coefficients p and q, rather
than using individual parameters, we use p+ q and q/p, as done by Krishnan et al.
(1999) and Druehl et al. (2009). We experiment with (0.2, 0.3, 0.4) for p + q and
with (1, 5, 25) for q/p. These values, which remain constant over time and across
generations (Norton and Bass 1987), capture diffusion processes with different char-
acteristics, as shown in Figure 1.5. The diffusion rate is faster with increasing p+ q,
and/or with decreasing q/p. We expect slower diffusion rates to favor dual roll; as
the new product garners adoptions, the old product continues selling at a higher
rate.
ατ τ (1 + α)τ
M1
M2












p+q=0.4, q/p=5, gen. 1
p+q=0.4, q/p=5, gen. 2
p+q=0.2, q/p=25, gen. 1
p+q=0.2, q/p=25, gen. 2
p+q=0.2, q/p=5, gen. 1
p+q=0.2, q/p=5, gen. 2
Figure 1.5: Arrival rates for different diffusion parameters.
Recall that the market responsiveness to preannouncements parameter φ takes
values from 0 (no responsiveness) to∞ (full responsiveness). As a result, we consider
in our study three levels of φ, as shown in Figure 1.3: 0 (low), 6.275 (medium), and
23
∞ (high). Higher φ indicates higher diffusion rates for the new product and therefore
lower market risk; thus, we expect higher φ to favor the single product roll.
The levels for the performance improvement per generation, γ, are (0, 0.5, 1),
corresponding to no improvement, 50% improvement, or 100% improvement. Recall
that γ plays a role in the arrival process of the new generation in two ways. First,
performance improvement expands the potential customer base according to Mi =
(1 + γ)Mi−1. Thus the levels of γ correspond to no growth, 50% growth, and the
market doubling in size. Second, performance improvement increases the probability
of customers choosing the new product over the old according to h(γ). The levels






. In other words,
higher γ refers to lower market risk for the new product and should favor the single
roll. Finally, γ affects reservation prices as described next.
1.4.3 Parameters Describing the Reservation Prices: µ, k
Recall that customer reservation prices follow Weibull distributions. In order to
reflect diminishing customer valuations over time, we let the scale parameter β of
the old generation decrease linearly with a slope per τ equal to µ 6 0 2. Let βi(t)









, t ∈ [ατ, (1 + α)τ ].
2Other decreasing patterns, such as convex, concave, or piecewise linear, can be used; however,
preliminary tests showed that this choice does not significantly impact our results.
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We set β1(ατ) = 10, without loss of generality, and experiment with µ using
(−0.2,−0.5,−0.8). By definition, higher µ means that customer reservation prices
decline slowly and the old product can thus sell at higher prices longer. Therefore,
higher µ should favor dual roll, where the old product remains in the market longer.
For product 2, we find that an increasing or a decreasing pattern for β2(t)
does not significantly affect the results but does complicate the model. Thus we
use a constant scale parameter where β2(t) = β1(ατ)(1 + γ) = 10(1 + γ), ∀t. We
base this assumption on the fact that typically customer willingness to pay increases
with performance, and on the definition of the reservation price Rit (as discussed
in Appendix A). Using this definition requires that β2 ((1 + α)τ) = β1 ((1 + α)τ) =
β1(ατ)(1 + γ).
We assume that the Weibull shape parameter ki is the same for both genera-
tions and is time invariant. We run experiments with k1 = k2 = k = (1.2, 3.6, 10.8),
which reflect different variability levels in consumer valuations (see Figure 1.4). Note
also that because we assume G2t(·) = G2(·) ∀t, according to Proposition 1, the price
for the new product will be constant during the planning horizon.
1.4.4 Auxiliary Parameters and Summary of Runs
The unit production cost is a scale parameter and we set cp = 1. Choice of unit
salvage value is arbitrary as long as it satisfies the condition that marginal cost
is positive; in other words, cs makes the right-hand side of Equation (A.9) in Ap-
pendix A greater than zero. We set the unit holding cost per period to ch = 0.025,
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corresponding to approximately 34.5% of unit production cost annually. Further-
more, we set the continuous time discount rate to δ = 0.005 per period, ≈ 6.2% per
year. Preliminary tests showed that ch and δ were not significantly influential on
the comparison between rollover strategies and are held fixed. We summarize our
experimental design in Table 1.2.
Table 1.2: Experimental design.
Parameter Levels
τ (10, 20, 30)
α (0.3, 0.5, 0.7)
p+ q (0.2, 0.3, 0.4)
q/p (1, 5, 25)
φ (0, 6.275,∞)
γ (0, 0.5, 1)
µ (−0.2,−0.5,−0.8)
k (1.2, 3.6, 10.8)
In total, there are 38 = 6, 561 experiments. For each experiment (run), we use
dt = 0.01 and use Propositions 1 and 2 to compute the prices, sales, inventory levels
and resulting profits in time, for both the dual and single roll strategies. Then,
we calculate the difference in profits (reported as dual minus single roll) for each
of the 6,561 cases. Finally, we conduct statistical analyses to understand the role
of experimental (input) parameters on the profit difference. Specifically, we use
regression with the experimental parameters as independent variables and analyze
the impact of each parameter on profit difference, the dependent variable, through
the t-statistic for its respective regression coefficient; this global sensitivity analysis
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is suggested by Wagner (1995), and it has been used in previous research as we
discuss below.
Table 1.3 gives the summary statistics for the difference in profits between the
rollover strategies. The average profit difference between strategies (profit in a dual
roll minus profit in a single roll) is -24.7, with a minimum, median, and maximum
values of -9944.7, 154.8, and 11086.2. This means that the choice between a single
and dual roll strategy is not trivial; values of the input parameters determine the best
strategy. These results confirm the earlier research (Billington et al. 1998, Erhun
et al. 2007) on rollover strategy that argues that the choice is situation dependent.
Similar to those papers, our purpose is not to decide which rollover strategy is
better, but rather to investigate which one is better under what setting in a more
concrete analytical setting. Therefore, we run a series of regression analyses in order
to understand the effect of input parameters in this comparison of the two strategies.










We first pre-process the input parameters so that the regression results yield more
meaningful insights. For k and q/p, we employ a log transformation; we then nor-
malize φ such that φ → ∞ corresponds to 1, φ → 0 corresponds to 0, and accord-
ingly, φ = 6.275 to 0.5 (see Appendix A for the normalizing relationship); finally,
we center all variables around their respective means. We perform multiple linear
regression with the profit difference as the dependent variable and the processed
input parameters as the independent variables. The summary of this regression is
given in Table 1.4. We present the t-values and the statistical significance levels
to summarize the level and direction of the particular variable’s influence (Druehl
et al. 2009, Souza et al. 2004). All variables are significant at p < 0.0001 (except for
log(k), which is significant at p < 0.05), and we note that the signs on the estimates
confirm our initial expectations.
We also performed two more multiple linear regressions with the profits from
dual and single roll, respectively, as the dependent variables to examine the effect
of the input parameters on these profits. All variables are significant at p < 0.0001
and again the signs on the estimates confirm expectations.
We make the following observations:
(i) Increasing τ , the time between introductions, increases the sales horizon for
both the old and new product under either single or dual roll, and therefore
results in higher profits under either strategy. Although the theoretical impli-
cations of τ are unclear, in our setting we find that its effect on single roll is
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greater and therefore that larger τ favors single roll.
Table 1.4: Statistics of multiple linear regression: Main effects.
Dependent variable: Dual - Single profit difference
Factor t-value
(intercept) -1.6 ·
τ -36.4 ∗ ∗ ∗
α 5.4 ∗ ∗ ∗
log(k) -2.3 ∗
µ 21.1 ∗ ∗ ∗
γ -21.3 ∗ ∗ ∗
p+ q -26.1 ∗ ∗ ∗
log(q/p) 40.8 ∗ ∗ ∗
φ -56.5 ∗ ∗ ∗
Adj. R-sq. 0.543
Statistical significance codes: ‘∗ ∗ ∗’: p ≈ 0; ‘∗’: 0.01 < p < 0.05; ‘·’: p > 0.1
(ii) As α increases, the dual roll strategy tends to have higher profits compared
to single roll. This is because a higher value of α shortens the selling horizon
for the first generation in single roll and as a result decreases sales.
(iii) As expected, higher diffusion speed—higher p+ q, lower q/p, higher φ—favors
single product rollovers, while increasing the profits for both strategies on
average.
(iv) Similarly, a higher performance improvement amount, γ, results in faster dif-
fusion and a larger and more favorable market for the new product. Conse-
quently, a higher γ also favors single roll as well as increases profits on average
under either strategy.
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(v) Increasing µ or k increases profits under either strategy. A larger µ, affecting
the reservation price scale parameter, indicates a more favorable market for
the old generation, and therefore a dual roll tends to result in higher profits.
A larger k (shape parameter) favors a single roll, but it has the least statistical
significance in the comparison. We conclude that lower variance in reservation
prices increases profits under dual and single roll in almost the same way, and
thus loses its significance when they are compared.
(vi) Given by their t-values, parameters are ordered as φ > q/p > τ > p+ q > γ >
µ > α > k with respect to their influence on the profit difference. With respect
to profit levels, the ordering is γ > τ > k > α > φ > q/p > p + q > µ. This
indicates that in the decision of whether to use a single or dual roll strategy, the
diffusion rates, time between introductions, and performance improvement are
the most important. Recall that φ, q/p and p+q are all measures of the speed
of diffusion. Given a particular rollover strategy, the strongest influencers
of profit are performance improvement, time between introductions, and the
shape parameter.
An interesting observation from the experimental runs is when the maximum
and minimum differences between dual and single profits occur. Dual (single) roll
achieves the greatest profit advantage when q/p is at the highest (lowest) level,
p + q and φ are at their lowest (highest) levels, while k, α, µ, τ , and γ are at their
highest levels. This seems to indicate that market risk, and in particular, speed
of diffusion, is a key factor in the decision of rollover strategy, again confirming
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managerial prescriptions (Billington et al. 1998, Erhun et al. 2007).
We also consider the effect of interactions between the eight parameters be-
cause the adjusted R-squared value of 0.543, while it does not take away from our
first-order insights, indicates that the main effects-only model is not sufficient to
fully explain the profit difference between dual and single roll. Therefore, in order
to obtain deeper insights, we conduct additional regression analyses incorporating
two-way interaction effects between all input parameters. Here we summarize our
results which are given in Table A.1 in Appendix A. All two-way interactions are
highly significant (p < 0.0001), with the exception of τ and µ, α and log(k). The ad-
justed R-squared value increases to 0.837, showing that the optimal rollover strategy
decision is driven by the interplay between the input parameters. We find that the
shape parameter k, whose main effect on profit differences is not highly significant,
is highly significant in interaction with other independent variables. Moreover, we
observe that for all variables, the interaction terms with k have the same sign as
their main effects in Table 1.4. In other words, higher k amplifies the main effects of
all other variables. This means that if the variability of customer reservation prices
is (or, is predicted to be) low (i.e., high k), then any errors in estimating (or, decid-
ing on, when applicable) the other parameters will have more serious consequences
and may easily result in an erroneous choice between single and dual roll strategies.
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1.5 Conclusion
We study the decision process a firm undertakes when introducing a new generation
of a product while phasing out the old. We address many aspects of this problem,
including product rollover strategy (single vs. dual), dynamic pricing and inventory
control, preannouncements, and technology advancement. Erhun et al. (2007) and
Billington et al. (1998) indicate that the demand situation influences the choice of
rollover strategy. Accordingly, we use a demand model that incorporates an infor-
mation diffusion process based on preannouncements and the Bass model, as well as
a heterogeneous customer base with reservation prices that may change in time and
exhibit various levels of responsiveness to preannouncements. To our knowledge,
we are the first to provide a formal analysis of this problem in a unified analytical
framework with a more complete demand model; previous literature looked at only a
subset of these aspects at a time. Our novel model enables us to incorporate several
decision parameters jointly for an overall understanding and sensitivity analysis.
The results of our study confirm some managerial prescriptions and uncover
interactions of several parameters that were not examined before. The optimal price
path closely follows changes in reservation price curves for the two products over
time. We find that lower market risk characterized by faster diffusion speed favors
single roll compared to dual roll, confirming the managerial prescriptions by Billing-
ton et al. (1998); however, we also show that the rate of performance improvement
and the market responsiveness to preannouncements play an important role in the
diffusion process and thus in the comparison of rollover strategies. Furthermore, we
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find that timing decisions (introduction of new product, and preannouncement/final
build of the old) are highly related to the rollover strategy decision. Ultimately, we
show that the interaction of all these parameters/decisions drives the choice between
dual and single roll.
We acknowledge the limitations posed by the assumptions of our model. We do
not explicitly study competition and its influence on the decision process; however,
parameters regarding the diffusion process and reservation price distribution may be
modified to reflect the existence of competition. We reduce the interaction of new
and old product to an (exogenous) diffusion process since doing so helps simplify the
dynamic pricing mechanism. We leave the investigation of joint pricing of old and
new generations to future research. Finally, one can investigate the possible supply
related issues especially for the new product; this is one of the common reasons for
new product failure and should be incorporated in an ideal decision framework.
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Chapter 2
Return Policies and Seller-Provided Information in Experience Good
Markets
2.1 Introduction
Consumers are typically uncertain about what to expect from a product that they
have no experience with, even though they do not lack information regarding the
feature set, performance specs or the quality of the good. The source of uncertainty
lies in their individual preferences and/or utility regarding that good; they are un-
sure if they will like an upcoming book, a new dress, if they prefer a particular
furniture design alternative over another, or if they can comfortably use a new elec-
tric razor. For many—if not the vast majority of—goods, consumers can have but
a vague idea about the value of using/owning it before having personal experience
with it; there is always a possibility that it is not a perfect fit. This type of good is
commonly referred to as “experience good” (Nelson 1970), while this phenomenon
is particularly prevalent for new-to-market goods.
Consumers learn more of their true valuation as they gather more information
regarding the good (Ackerberg 2003), and they can make a better purchase deci-
sion given more information. Direct contact—through trial versions or periods, free
samples, previews, fit-rooms, test-drives, and so forth—with the exact or a similar
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product, interaction with sales personnel, peer or expert reviews, and other forms of
word-of-mouth, which we collectively refer to as informational tools, serve this pur-
pose. We observe that many sellers put effort to make informational tools available
to consumers. For example, fit-rooms are standard practice in department stores
such as Macy’s; Adobe Systems, Inc., like many software companies, offers a 30-day
trial of its products such as Acrobat Professional; Costco.com offers free samples
of select items; in a recent campaign, Mitsubishi let people over the Internet to re-
motely test-drive an actual vehicle on a closed course; Best Buy spends as much as
5% of its total sales on employee training (Kump 2005). Some of these informational
tools serve as a means for advertising, however we focus only on the information
regarding the product that is conveyed to the consumer.
While seller-provided informational tools help the consumers make a better
purchase decision, they do not fully resolve the uncertainty regarding product fit.
According to a recent survey by the National Retail Federation, more than $185
billion worth of retail merchandise, amounting to 8% of total retail sales, was re-
turned to sellers in 2009 in the US (Davis 2010). More strikingly, recent studies
show that a large percentage of these returns have no verifiable defect; for example,
they account for up to 80% of HP printer returns (Ferguson et al. 2006), and 95% of
all electronics purchases (Lawton 2008). These returns are made possible through
the customized return policies offered by the sellers. For example, Amazon.com
has 31 different product-specific return policies with restocking fees of up to 50%,
Best Buy has a customized return policy with restocking fees up to 25%, Nordstrom
offers full refunds for any return to their stores. In effect, return policies enable
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consumers to defer their ownership decisions until after they gain some experience
with the product (for a fee, in the case of partial refunds). In other words, they
act as a contract that allocates the product fit-risk between the consumer and the
seller; with full refunds, the seller takes on all the risk.
The interaction between the informational state of a consumer and returns
is natural: The more informed the consumer, the less the likelihood of a return.
However, it is neither practically possible to fully inform each and every consumer
in order to stop any returns due to product misfit, nor it is clear that the seller
should stop all such returns. It is further unclear how providing partial information
effects the consumer return behavior, and therefore how the seller should design her
return policy given the consumers’ imperfect information level. While lenient return
policies are highly valued by all consumers, they are open to abuse by some. The
National Retail Federation reports that more than $9.5 billion worth of retail returns
in 2009 was deemed to be fraudulent returns (Davis 2010). Lenient return policies
may also leave the seller with too many returned items, resulting in high processing
and supply chain management costs, and possible negative brand implications, due
to the product being perceived as a high return rate brand; for example, Lawton
(2008) reports that 25% of people who return an item refrain from buying that
same brand again, while 14% of such people are unlikely to buy from the same seller
again. Stringent return policies—high restocking fees or non-refundable charges,
limited eligibility or time period, etc.—may result in negative perception of brand,
worsened consumer satisfaction, and eventually lost sales, due to some dissatisfied
buyers being unable to return.
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Our observations of the interaction between informational tools and return
policies in experience good markets lead us to important research questions: Given
that successful reverse supply chain management practices can maximize the value of
returns (Guide et al. 2006), is there an optimal return rate for the seller? Considering
the interaction between product information and returns, how much information
should the seller provide and how should she design her return policies in order to
maximize her profits while managing consumer dissatisfaction?
In order to answer these research questions, we develop a novel model of a
consumer’s learning process through informational tools provided by the seller. Our
two-period model captures the interaction between information provision, return
policies, prices and consumer dissatisfaction, and we analytically show that this
interaction governs a consumer’s pre- and post-purchase decisions, and therefore
the market outcome overall. In this study, we focus on the implications of return
policies regarding brand/product perception (pre-purchase effect), consumer satis-
faction (post-purchase effect), and word-of-mouth (delayed future effect).
We contribute to the existing literature in several ways. To our knowledge, this
is the first analytical study that addresses the role of partial information in consumer
purchasing behavior, and its implications on product return decisions. We treat the
information state of a consumer as a continuous variable and build a tractable yet
comprehensive model around it. Furthermore, we consider the full spectrum of
return policies from zero to 100% refunds, and incorporate pricing into the seller’s
decision process. This is the first study to tackle joint optimization of information,
return policies and prices in a continuous decision space. We identify conditions
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under which a seller chooses not to provide any information even if it is costless.
Furthermore, we find that even when it is optimal to provide full information (so
that all consumers know their true valuation of the product before purchase), the
seller can instead provide only partial information and offer a specific partial refund
return policy such that the same outcome is achieved. We further find that it is
never strictly optimal to offer full refunds. We note that these conclusions are robust
to distributional assumptions.
The rest of the essay is organized as follows. Section 2.2 gives a review of the
relevant literature. In Section 2.3, we develop our basic model, and we provide a full
analysis of the monopoly case in Section 2.4. In Section 2.5 we solve the seller’s joint
optimization problem analytically and discuss the findings. Section 2.6 summarizes
our findings, and provides directions for extensions.
2.2 Literature Review
The paper that most closely relates to ours is by Shulman et al. (2009), who inves-
tigate a single seller with two products on a single-period setting, and they consider
product returns and exchanges given that the consumers are uncertain of their val-
uations as well as the products’ fit, and their valuations are uniformly distributed.
They assume that the consumers are either fully uninformed or fully informed.
In contrast, we capture penalty for consumer dissatisfaction due to product misfit
through market growth in the second period. We model the purchasing behavior of
a partially informed consumer, address both sources of uncertainty without using
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exogenous parameters, and we obtain several results without explicit distributional
assumptions. The main findings of Shulman et al. (2009) are that a seller’s optimal
refund amount can be higher or lower than the salvage value and it depends on
her cost structure as well as consumer preferences, and that eliminating returns by
providing full information is not always optimal. We find that the optimal refund
amount depends on consumer dissatisfaction, and that a refund amount more than
the salvage value is never exercised. Like Shulman et al. (2009), we find that elimi-
nating returns is not always optimal. We further find, however, that the seller can
devise a particular partial refund return policy that eliminates returns. In other
words, our result suggests using return policies as an alternative to providing infor-
mation in order to eliminate returns.
Matthews and Persico (2007) consider a single-period model where consumers
are uninformed and may seek information to learn their valuation of the product.
In their model, consumers are either fully uninformed or fully informed, and the
seller decides on the refund amount and price. As a result of the single-period
setting, the seller is motivated to use return policies to induce consumers to not
seek information and to make an uninformed purchase decision. In our model, all
consumers are information seekers but it is the seller who decides on the amount of
information to provide, and we find conditions under which it is optimal to withhold
information.
A crucial aspect of our study is that we investigate the future consequences of
dissatisfied consumers by incorporating market growth and the effect of consumer
dissatisfaction and returns on sales through word-of-mouth. This is the first study
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to address this aspect of consumers returns; all other works in relevant literature
assume a single-period, myopic setting (Shulman et al. 2009, Su 2009, Ketzenberg
and Zuidwijk 2009, Matthews and Persico 2007, Yalabik et al. 2005, Davis et al.
1995). This assumption forces these studies to further assume the salvage value
of a returned item to be less than its production/acquisition cost, which may not
be realistic when the return occurs not due to product failure but product misfit
(Ferguson et al. 2006). While Shulman et al. (2009) provide insights that relate a
seller’s forward channel cost structure to optimal refunds and information provision,
incorporating market growth enables us to extend their work in this respect and show
that a seller’s cost structure as well as market diffusion capabilities in her forward
channel are important in her decision process.
Regarding product fit, the common practice in the literature is to assume an
exogenous fit probability (Shulman et al. 2009, Yalabik et al. 2005, Chu et al. 1998,
Hess et al. 1996, Davis et al. 1995). In contrast, we model the fact that a consumer
makes her purchase and return decisions considering both the value of the product
and its price. For example, a consumer who purchased, from an online store, a pair
of shoes that turned out to be too tight is dissatisfied not because the shoe has
absolutely no value to her (she may gift it to a friend, etc.), but because the realized
value is not a match to the price she paid for it (whereas she thought, pre-purchase,
that it was). Another common practice in the literature is to use a parameter
representing the consumer’s cost of returning in order to explain the phenomenon
where a dissatisfied consumer is unwilling to return (Shulman et al. 2009, Matthews
and Persico 2007, Yalabik et al. 2005, Chu et al. 1998, Davis et al. 1998, Hess et al.
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1996). Our model endogenously captures this phenomenon without using a hassle
cost parameter.
Che (1996) and Davis et al. (1995) compare a full-refund return policy to a
no-returns policy. Su (2009) considers partial refunds, however he assumes that
consumers have no ex-ante information regarding the product, and he does not
consider acquisition or provision of information. Ketzenberg and Zuidwijk (2009)
also considers partial refunds but they assume an exogenous return probability in a
deterministic model of product returns and remanufacturing. Heiman et al. (2001)
also assume an exogenous return probability and value of information, and they
compare the alternatives of demonstrating the product and/or offering a full refund.
Ackerberg (2003) empirically finds that, in experience goods markets, the primary
effect of advertising is that of informing the consumers of their valuations. We build
our research on this fact and we model the learning process of a consumer and
study its endogenous consequences on her pre- and post-purchase behavior, given
seller provided information tools and a full spectrum of return policies from zero
to 100% refunds. To our knowledge, this is the first work that investigates optimal
refunds, optimal provision of information and optimal prices jointly in a continuous
decision space.
To summarize, the existing literature on consumer returns does not study the
impact of seller-provided (partial) information in consumer pre- and post-purchase
behavior, or the interaction of return policies and knowledge state of consumers. It
also does not consider the negative impact of consumer dissatisfaction and product
returns on the firm’s brand and consequent potential market size in the future. Our
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research addresses these shortcomings by endogenizing different market outcomes
that were treated exogenously in the existing literature.
2.3 Model
We build our model based on the real-life observations pointed out in Section 2.1.
In the following, we first describe how we model consumer valuations given partial
information on the product. Then, we detail the setting and the planning horizon
over which the seller maximizes profits.
2.3.1 Consumer Uncertainty
We model a consumer’s valuation of a product as a learning process. Consider a new
product being introduced to the market. With no private information regarding the
product, a consumer can only have a näive expected valuation. Therefore, at this
zero-state, the consumer pool is homogeneous in terms of their ex-ante valuations;
we denote the zero-state ex-ante consumer valuation as v0.
Seller-provided informational tools help a consumer draw inference (prior to
purchase) about his true ex-post valuation, denoted by v. Without loss of generality,
we assume v ∈ [0, 1]. We consider a mapping from the amount of seller’s effort to
the amount of consumer learning, α ∈ [0, 1], and we assume that consumers learn
homogeneously. We do not model how the seller’s efforts, which may be quantified
in monetary terms, map to consumer learning; we merely postulate that given some
(if any) effort to inform the consumers, a consumer’s knowledge state is α ∈ [0, 1],
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where α = 1 means a fully informed consumer. We assume that the seller knows
this mapping; that is, while deciding how much effort to put on informational tools,
the seller effectively decides on α. As a result, we hereinafter refer to α as the
“amount of information provided by the seller.” In order to isolate and investigate
the underlying motivations for the seller to provide information or not, we assume
that providing information has no cost to the seller; if there are conditions where
the seller chooses not to provide information when it’s free, then it would mean
there is a wider range of such conditions with costly information provision. We later
comment on the impact of costly information provision on our results.
We model the valuation learning process such that, at an α-state, a consumer
of type v has ex-ante valuation of
vα = (1− α)v0 + αv. (2.1)
In other words, consumers approach their idiosyncratic ex-post valuations as they
learn more about the product. With full information (α = 1), there is no valua-
tion uncertainty since each consumer realizes his ex-post valuation even before the
purchase. In Figure 2.1, we give an illustration of consumer learning and resulting
heterogeneity, as modeled in this study.
We assume that there is a single pool of consumers with individual valuations,
V , drawn identically and independently from a publicly known distribution, F , de-
fined over [0, 1]. Then, in the absence of any return policy, v0 = E[V ]. However,
given a return policy with a refund factor of β ∈ (0, 1], consumers have the opportu-
nity to re-consider their initial purchase decision as follows. Denoting the sales price
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by p, a consumer will either keep the product (if v ≥ pβ) or return it for refund
(if v < pβ). Thus, given β, v0 = E[max{V, pβ}]. Substituting in (2.1), the ex-ante
valuation of a consumer with ex-post valuation v is given by









Figure 2.1: Illustration of consumer learning and heterogeneity with information.
At an α-state, by definition, the consumer purchases the product if vα ≥ p.
From (2.2), one can show that this condition is equivalent to v ≥ vθ, where
vθ(α, β) , p+
(1− α)
α
(p− E[max{V, pβ}]) , α ∈ (0, 1], β ∈ [0, 1] (2.3)
is the threshold ex-post valuation for purchase. Note that the definition of vθ above
presumes α > 0, since we have homogeneity when α = 0; either all consumers
purchase if v0 ≥ p, or none of them purchase if v0 < p.
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2.3.2 Market Demand
We conceptualize a two-period model to capture the long-run consequences of seller’s
decisions. At the beginning of the first period, the seller announces a new product to
be introduced to the market, and sets the first-period price, p1 and the refund factor,
β. At the same time, the seller also decides on α and accordingly provides tools to
help the consumers make a more informed purchase decision. The seller announces
the second-period price, p2, after the first-period arrivals and their purchase decision.
The product is made available for purchase only at the end of each period; there are
thus two purchase points. The chronology of events is summarized in Figure 2.2.
We assume that this product is sufficiently distinguished from existing products in
the market to induce an uncertainty in consumer valuations as studied in this essay.
Seller announces product, 
available at the end of period 1.
Seller decides on return policy
and first period price.
Seller provides information:
Product is available for purchase.
First period arrivals.
Seller decides on second period price
Second period arrivals.




Figure 2.2: Chronology of events in the two-period setting.
We normalize the initial size of the potential consumer population to 1. These
first-period arrivals are analogous to the “innovators” as described in Bass (1969),
and are uncertain in their valuations as described above. During the second period,
the innovators “spread the word” such that each first-period arrival who is not
dissatisfied creates a second-period consumer base of g ≥ 0; we assume this process
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to be deterministic for parsimony 3. Therefore, the more consumers are dissatisfied
in the first period, the less potential buyers in the second period; this dynamic
effectively captures the future consequences of consumer dissatisfaction. We assume
that even with full refunds (β = 1), the consumers who return their items do not
contribute to market growth in the second period; this effectively incorporates the
negative impact of returns to brand and seller image (Lawton 2008). As a result,
in our model, the larger the parameter g, the greater the negative consequences of
causing consumer dissatisfaction and/or returns. Therefore, hereinafter, we aptly
refer to g as “misfit penalty.”
We further assume that the second-period arrivals have full information re-
garding their valuations (through owner experiences and reviews as well as seller
provided informational tools); there is no valuation uncertainty in the second pe-
riod. Finally, we assume that any returns occur at the end of the second period and
any returning consumers leave the market.
This setting enables us to study interesting aspects of seller’s decisions:
• Through vθ, a consumer’s purchasing decision in the first period is determined
not only by p1, but also by α and β.
• Although providing information has a possible cost to the seller, it enables
3With this definition, we assume that any first-period arrival contributes to the second-period
market even if he leaves without purchasing. The underlying reasoning is that the diffusion (of
information) is triggered by being aware of the product, not by purchasing it. While we take it as
given, the value of g is an indicator of the product’s market diffusion speed which is affected by
market and product characteristics.
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consumers to make more informed decisions in the first period and therefore
decreases returns.
• Offering a generous return policy (high β) increases sales in the first period.
However, as we show in the following section, a sufficiently high β results
in consumers purchasing and being dissatisfied post-purchase, which in turn
decreases sales in the second period.
In the next section, we show how the interplay of these three decisions determine
the overall outcome both for the seller and the consumers. We analyze the seller’s
optimal decision strategy in detail and solve her profit maximization problem under
a more specific setting.
2.4 Analysis of the Model
2.4.1 Structural Properties
We start our analysis by showing some structural properties of the seller’s (α, β)
decision space for a given p1. First recall that under our setting, the condition for
consumer purchasing in the first period, vα ≥ p1, is equivalent to v ≥ vθ; however,
each consumer realizes her own ex-post valuation, v, only after she purchases the
product. If it turns out that v ≥ p1, then the consumer is satisfied. If v < p1
she is dissatisfied; in this case, if her valuation is as low as to be below the refund
amount (v < p1β), then she returns the item, otherwise she keeps it although she
is dissatisfied. As a result, there are three possible market outcomes depending on
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Consumers who purchase in the first period
0 1 vp1p1β v
Dissatisfied buyers
who keep Satisfied buyers
Consumers who purchase in the first period
0 1 vv
Consumers who purchase
in the first period






Figure 2.3: Possible cases for vθ and corresponding market outcomes.
Case I (vθ ≥ p1): If vθ ≥ p1, all consumers who purchase the product have non-
negative surplus (v ≥ p1), since they purchase only if v ≥ vθ. All buyers are
satisfied, and there are no returns.
Case II (p1 > vθ ≥ p1β): In this case, there are some dissatisfied buyers (v < p1),
but all buyers have v ≥ p1β: There are some consumers who are dissatisfied
with their purchase but none of them return their item as the refund amount
is not sufficiently attractive.
Case III (vθ < p1β): When vθ < p1β, there are some dissatisfied buyers with p1 >
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v ≥ p1β who keep their items but also some with v < p1β who return for a
refund; there are some buyers who are dissatisfied but not all of them return
their items.
The boundary vθ = p1 is of particular importance since it marks the condition
for efficient allocation of the product: When vθ = p1, a consumer’s purchasing
condition becomes v ≥ p1 and therefore, 1) all consumers who value the product at
least as much as its price purchase the product, and 2) all consumers who purchase
the product value it at least as much as its price. Note that, when vθ = p1, this
efficient allocation is achieved ex-ante, as opposed to ex-post (which is possible
through a full refund return policy, β = 1). From (2.3), vθ = p1 is satisfied for α = 1
(full information) regardless of the value of β. We show that it can also be satisfied
with partial information (0 < α < 1) and if p1 ≥ E[V ], and we state this result in
Proposition 3 below.
Proposition 3 With partial information, i.e. 0 < α < 1, and for p1 ≥ E[V ], there
exists a βp ∈ [0, 1] such that ex-ante efficient allocation is achieved, i.e., vθ(α, βp) =
p1. Furthermore, vθ(α, β) > p1 if β < βp and vθ(α, β) < p1 if β > βp.
Proof See Appendix B.
Proposition 3 is a significant result as it means that, even without providing
full information, the seller can achieve ex-ante efficient allocation of the product
through a partial-refund return policy, i.e. by setting β = βp. In other words,
return policies can be used to substitute for full information in order to minimize
consumer dissatisfaction and returns, even when providing information is costless.
49
This means that under costly information provision, the seller has a clear incentive
to design such a return policy in order to minimize consumer dissatisfaction and
returns.
We see from (2.3) that for a given p1, any fixed vθ value results in a relationship
between α and β. Therefore, the three cases above translate into three regions on
the (α, β) plane, as shown in Figure 2.4. In essence, vθ is on the z-axis in Figure 2.4
and each boundary seen on the (α, β) plane represents the curve satisfying the
specified relationship. Although the graph is plotted for uniform valuations and a
particular p1 value, we show in Appendix B that it is representative of the general
case (in terms of the signs of first and second order derivatives). Note that the cases
p1 ≥ E[V ] and p1 < E[V ] result in different graphs since in the latter, vθ > p1 for
all β ∈ [0, 1] without full information (0 < α < 1), and therefore Region I does not
exist (see proof of Proposition 3 in Appendix B).
p1 = 0.51 > E[V ] p1 = 0.45 < E[V ]
ΥΘ = 1 ΥΘ = 0
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ΥΘ = p1 Β
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II
ΥΘ < p1 Β
III









Figure 2.4: Seller’s (α, β) decision space for V ∼ U(0, 1) at different price points.
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We now turn our attention to the seller’s general profit maximization problem.
2.4.2 Seller’s Optimization Problem
Facing the market dynamics described in Section 2.3, the seller maximizes two-
period profits by determining the optimal set of decisions, (α∗, β∗, p∗1, p
∗
2). Demand
in the first period is (1 − F (vθ)), since we have unit market size. Demand in the
second period is (g(1 − F (p2))(1 − L)), where L , max{0, F (p1) − F (vθ)} is the
rate of dissatisfaction in the first-period market. Fraction of returns is given by
M , max{0, F (p1β) − F (vθ)} and an amount of p1β is refunded for each return.
Production cost per unit is c and each returned product (if any) has a net salvage
value of s. We assume reasonably that s ∈ (0, 1). Note that we allow for s > c,
in which case there is a profitable market for returned items. We write the seller’s
optimization problem in general form as follows and characterize the optimal second-
period price in Proposition 4.
max
α,β,pi
R = (p1 − c) (1− F (vθ)) + (−p1β + s)M + g (p2 − c) (1− F (p2)) (1− L)
s.t. α, β ∈ [0, 1]
(2.4)
Proposition 4 The optimal price in the second period is given by
p∗2 = arg max
p
(p− c) (1− F (p)).
Proof The solution for p2 follows since p2 appears only in the final term in the
objective function and since g (1− L) ≥ 0 under any circumstances.
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Proposition 4 shows that the optimization of p2 is decoupled from the rest
of the decision process. Therefore in the rest of the essay, we continue studying
the joint optimization of α, β and p1. In the next section, we determine strictly
dominated regions and identify conditions for optimality of others.
2.4.3 Characterization of Optimal Information and Refunds
As discussed in Appendix B, boundaries in the (α, β) decision space, which are
critical for consumer dissatisfaction and existence of returns, are functions of p1.
Although this complicates the seller’s problem of jointly optimizing α, β and p1, we
find that a general characterization of the optimal α and β is possible for a given
p1. We summarize our findings in Proposition 5. Note that we do not yet make
any assumptions as to how the consumer valuations are distributed. In the rest of
the essay, we use superscripts for association to the indicated region in the (α, β)
decision space, and we use the subscript θ to indicate a threshold value.
Proposition 5 For a given p1, the optimal (α, β) corresponds to one of the two
candidate solutions below, depending on the values of p1, g, c and s, and on the
distribution F . We depict these solutions in Figure 2.5.
i) Solution (D): (α∗, β∗) =
{
(α, β) | α ∈ [0, 1− p1




This solution lies on the region where vθ = 0 and p1β ≤ s. All consumers
purchase but the optimal refund amount is less than the salvage value.
ii) Solution (E): (α∗, β∗) = {(α, β) | vθ = p1}
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This solution implies ex-ante efficient allocation, i.e. vθ = p1, which is




D ΥΘ = 0

















Figure 2.5: Candidate solutions in the seller’s (α, β) decision space for V ∼ U(0, 1).
Specifically, if g > ḡEθ , then Solution (E) is optimal; if g < ḡ
E
θ , then Solution
(D) is optimal, where
ḡEθ =
(












Proof See Appendix B.
Proposition 5 finds that for sufficiently small misfit penalty, Solution (D),
which sells to all consumers in the first period, is optimal; equivalently, for suffi-
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ciently large misfit penalty, Solution (E), which suggests no returns through ex-ante
efficient allocation, is optimal. This result has three immediate corollaries. The first
is that there are conditions that makes the ex-ante efficient allocation undesirable
for the seller. Specifically, if the net profit of selling a product to a consumer in the
first period exceeds the expected loss in the second period due to dissatisfying that
consumer, then the seller chooses (α, β) such that every consumer in the first pe-
riod purchases a product, regardless of his valuation. Since the expected loss in the
second period increases with misfit penalty, we conclude that if the misfit penalty
is sufficiently small, then it is optimal to sell to all consumers in the first period.
Furthermore, observe that ḡEθ , which is the threshold for absolute dominance of So-
lution (E), increases in s; the larger the salvage value, the narrower the dominance
region of Solution (E).
Second, offering a refund amount of more than the salvage value of returned
items is not optimal unless it is optimal to provide full information. On the other
hand, in case of full information, the return policy is redundant (since there are no
returns) and the seller is indifferent in choosing a refund amount. Therefore, we say
that it is weakly suboptimal to offer a refund amount more than the salvage value.
Note that as long as the price is larger than the salvage value, this also means that
it is weakly suboptimal to offer a full (100%) refund.
Finally, note that in the case of costly information provision, if p1 ≥ E[V],
providing full information is never optimal since the seller can instead design a
return policy, by setting β = βp, to achieve the same effect. If, however, p1 < E[V],
then the seller would have more incentive to choose Solution (D); that is, Solution
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(D) would be optimal for a wider range of misfit penalty.
2.5 Jointly Optimal Information, Refund and Price Strategy
In the previous section, we identified the two candidate solutions for optimal (α, β)
without making any distributional assumptions, but under the assumption that p1
is given. We observe that there is no clear dominance relationship between these
solutions if p1 is a decision variable as well. In this section, we assume uniform
valuations, F (p) = p, and identify the candidate solutions for jointly optimizing
information, refund and price, and determine the conditions that lead to the opti-
mality of each solution. Uniform valuations is the most common assumption in the
operations management, marketing and economics literatures (Shulman et al. 2009,
Chesnokova 2007, Villas-Boas 2006, Davis et al. 1998, Chu et al. 1998). We employ
this assumption in this essay in order to facilitate closed-form optimal solutions for
better interpretation. This essentially constitutes the optimal (α, β, p1, p2) strategy
for the seller, contingent on the values of g, c, and s as given in Proposition 6. We
find that there is a boundary, critical for shaping the optimal strategy, in the (s, c)
plane, which we plot in Figure 2.6.
Proposition 6 With uniform valuations, the joint optimal (α, β, p1, p2) strategy is
such that;
For (s, c) such that c ≥ cθ(s) – Region (1) in Figure 2.6 – we have gE,Dθ ≤
gE,Cθ ≤ gD,Cθ , and
(a) If g ≥ gE,Cθ , the optimal solution is Solution (E),
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(b) If g < gE,Cθ , the optimal solution is Solution (C);






(a) If g ≥ gE,Dθ , the optimal solution is Solution (E),
(b) If gD,Cθ < g < g
E,D
θ , the optimal solution is Solution (D),








4(1 + s2)− 2(1 + c)2
(1 + s2)(1− c)2 ,
gE,Dθ =
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Figure 2.6: Critical regions in the (s, c) plane.
and
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Solution (E): (α∗, β∗) = {(α, β) | vθ = p∗1}, p∗1 = p∗2 = 1+c2 ,


























Proof See Appendix B.
We show in Proposition 6 that, for the joint optimization of α, β, p1 and p2,
there are three solutions among which the seller chooses, depending on the rela-
tionship between market parameters (c, s and g). Solution (E) corresponds to any
(α, β) pair that satisfies vθ = p1. We show in Section 2.4.1 that this implies efficient
allocation of the product at the time of purchase even under valuation uncertainty.
In other words, exactly those consumers who would purchase the product with full
information do purchase the product. We also show that this can be achieved either
by providing full information or, without full information, by setting the refund
amount to a certain level β = βp; when providing information is costless, the seller
is indifferent between these two options. However, under costly information provi-





. In either case, since the
consumer purchasing behavior is identical to full information case, the seller sets






Solutions (C) and (D) are both characterized by vθ = 0 but at different prices
and refund factors; Solution (C) suggests higher values in both: β∗(C) > β∗(D) and
p∗1(C) > p
∗
1(D). Therefore, Solution (C) offers a larger refund amount than Solution
(D); the former offers a refund amount equal to the salvage value (p∗1β
∗(C) = s),
while the latter offers half the salvage value (p∗1β
∗(D) = 1
2
s). In both Solutions (C)
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and (D), the seller provides no information and ensures that all consumers purchase
in the first period. Solution (C) offers a larger refund amount than Solution (D) and
attains higher ex-ante consumer valuations in the first period; as a result, the seller






. Due to higher price and higher refund
amount, Solution (C) results in both larger dissatisfaction rate (which is equal to
the price), and larger return rate (which is equal to the refund amount).
The optimal strategy states that Solution (E) should be preferred only when
the misfit penalty (g) is sufficiently large. In other words, if the misfit penalty
is sufficiently small, the seller chooses to maximize her profits at the expense of
consumer satisfaction. We further see that if the cost of production is sufficiently
large, Solution (D) is never optimal; higher production costs require higher prices
to compensate for them and Solution (C) is preferred. With low production costs,
there is a range of misfit penalty for which Solution (D) is optimal; for sufficiently
low misfit penalty, Solution (C), which is greedier, is optimal.
We attain an intuitive corollary out of Proposition 6, by noting that the opti-
mality threshold for Solution (E) in Region (1) is gE,Cθ ; in Region (2), the optimality











(4+s2)2(1−c)2 > 0. Therefore, for a constant c, larger s results in larger
thresholds, which in turn limits the optimality of range for Solution (E). We con-
clude that when salvage value is higher, it is easier for the seller to reject ex-ante
efficient allocation, thus to allow returns.
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2.6 Conclusion
In this essay, we study the profit maximization problem for a seller who optimizes
information provision, return policy and prices for a new experience good, over a
two-period horizon. With no information, consumers are fully uncertain of their
valuations of the product. However, given more information, they learn more, ap-
proaching to individual valuations; information creates ex-ante heterogeneity among
consumers. On the other hand, being aware of a return option, consumers update
their valuations of the purchase decision.
We make several important contributions with this study. We devise a novel
approach in understanding and modeling the process of a consumer’s learning of own
valuation, taking into consideration both partial information and partial-refund re-
turn policies. Our model incorporates two key parameters; 1) market growth rate,
g, which represents the seller’s forward channel capability; 2) s, which determines
the value of returned items and therefore points to the seller’s reverse channel ca-
pabilities. Building on the dynamics of interaction between information and return
policy in consumer valuations, we treat the seller’s optimization problem analyti-
cally, show structural properties of her decision space, and characterize the optimal
solution for the general case. These characterizations lead to three major findings
that are robust to distributional assumptions. First, if the market growth rate—
and hence the future penalty due to consumer dissatisfaction and/or returns—is
sufficiently low, then the seller may choose to provide no information to consumers
even if it is costless to do so. We also show that as the salvage value increases, it
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becomes easier for the seller to withhold information from consumers. This shows
how the seller’s reverse channel capabilities interact with her forward channel de-
cisions. Second, we show that even when it is optimal to ensure ex-ante efficient
allocation, Solution (E), it is not necessary to provide full information as this can
be achieved by devising the return policy appropriately (by setting β = βp) and
providing only partial information. This is a significant result as it showcases a
situation where the return policy can be used to substitute for informational tools.
Third, we find that offering a refund amount that is more than the salvage value is
never exercised; the seller can advertise such a refund amount when Solution (E) is
optimal, in which case there are no returns. Lastly, assuming uniform valuations,
we determine the optimal decision strategy for the seller, which dictates the optimal
values for information provision, refund factor and prices given model parameters.
Future work could investigate opportunistic consumer behavior where a con-
sumer “purchases without intention to keep.” A seller can be exposed to such
behavior if she offers lenient returns; tightening return policies for some sellers
is attributed to their losses due to this type of consumer behavior (Davis 2010).
Davis et al. (1995) and Hess et al. (1996) examine consumers who purchase with-
out intention to keep; however, they assume that consumers have no pre-purchase
information, and they do not consider information provision.
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Chapter 3
Managing Return Policies and Information Provision under
Competition
3.1 Introduction
More than 8% of total retail sales, $185 billion worth of retail merchandise, was
returned to sellers in 2009 in the US, and predictions for the near future indicate
similar outcomes (Davis 2010). While the substantial implications, in terms of direct
and overhead costs, of these returns for the whole supply chain makes the study of
consumer returns valuable, it is further interesting to observe that a significant
amount of these returns have no verifiable defect. For example, they account for
up to 80% of HP printer returns (Ferguson et al. 2006), and 95% of all electronics
purchases (Lawton 2008).
The primary reason for these “false-failure” returns is that the consumers
learn—only after the purchase—that the good is not a perfect fit to their tastes,
preferences, usage norms, established settings, etc. Take for example a consumer
purchasing a new electric razor only to realize that its grip is not as comfortable
as the old one he had, or a curtain set to be brought home only to notice it does
not match the color of furniture at home. When lacking experience with the good
before the purchase, the consumers cannot be certain of the true value of the good
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for them, and thus, there is a possibility for a misfit. This type of good is commonly
referred to as “experience good” (Nelson 1970). As a result, lack of information—
regarding the value of the good—is the underlying driver of false-failure returns of
experience goods.
Before purchasing an experience good, consumers mainly rely on the seller to
gain access to, and—however limited—experience with the good; this is especially
true in case of a new-to-market good. Consider for example trial versions of com-
mercial software, test-drive events organized by auto manufacturers, fit-rooms that
are a standard in all department stores, electronic stores with items displayed openly
with trained sales personnel present, free samples of cosmetic products made avail-
able through online or physical channels, product samples sent to expert reviewers,
etc. While the level of these efforts by firms vary greatly, their main purpose is to
reduce false-failure returns by providing the consumers information regarding the
true value of the goods. On the other hand, the sellers also offer customized return
policies that facilitate product returns. For example, Amazon.com has 31 different
product-specific return policies with restocking fees of up to 50%, Best Buy has
a customized return policy with restocking fees up to 25%, Nordstrom offers full
refunds for any return to their stores. In effect, return policies enable consumers
to defer their ownership decisions until after they gain some experience with the
product (for a fee, in the case of partial refunds).
If a seller’s objective is to maximize consumer satisfaction, the initial intuition
is that this goal can be achieved either by providing full information to all con-
sumers, or by offering a full-refund return policy. While providing full information
62
to each and every consumer would cut all false-failure returns, it is also practically
impossible to achieve. Offering full refunds would enable any misfit alleviated, how-
ever at the cost of the seller—on top of immediate financial costs, negative brand
implications can be substantial; Lawton (2008) reports that 25% of people who
return an item refrain from buying that same brand again, while 14% of such peo-
ple are unlikely to buy from the same seller again. On the other hand, we show
in Essay 2 that a monopoly seller can design a partial-refund return policy to get
rid of false-failure returns, while providing only partial information. In Essay 2,
we also identify conditions where it is in fact optimal for the monopoly seller to
minimize false-failure returns. Then, the question is ‘what happens when there is
competition?’ Specifically, we pursue the following research questions in this essay:
1) Given competition, is it still possible to design a return policy to effectively
minimize false-failure returns without having to provide full information? If
it is, is such an outcome ever desirable for the sellers?
2) Are there any equilibrium return policy and information provision decisions?
(a) How do they differ from the decisions of a monopoly?
(b) Under what conditions do they exist?
To address these questions, we build on the basic two-period model described
in Essay 2, with the exception of assuming uniform valuations for tractability. In
order to isolate the effect of competition, we conceptualize a perfectly symmetric
duopoly setting, and examine equilibrium information provision and return policy
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decisions. To our knowledge of the literature, this is the first scholarly work that
analytically studies the effects of competition on joint information provision and
return policy decisions. We identify all potential Nash equilibria and their respective
conditions of existence. Contrasting the results to the monopoly case, we find that,
while competition can induce sellers to withhold information from the consumers
under certain conditions, it forces them to offer full refunds.
The rest of the essay is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the relevant
literature. In Section 3.3, we describe and analyze the competition model, and we
examine and discuss the equilibrium in Section 3.4. We conclude in Section 3.5.
3.2 Literature Review
Among the very few studies that investigate competition in a similar context as ours,
the paper by Shulman et al. (2011) is the most relevant. In Shulman et al. (2011),
they examine equilibrium prices and return policies in a competitive market where
consumers are not informed of their tastes or valuations. On a single-period horizon,
the sellers offer horizontally-differentiated products but provide no information to
consumers, and they extract no value out of returned items. Our competition set-
ting is significantly different from theirs in that we look at equilibrium information
provision and return policies incorporating consumer dissatisfaction in the second
period. We show that consumer dissatisfaction and salvage value are critical in
determining the market equilibrium. In direct contrast to our findings, Shulman
et al. (2011) conclude that competition may induce higher restocking fees, whereas
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we find that sellers typically offer full refunds in a competitive setting. Their result
can be explained by noting that they do not consider the impact of high restocking
fees on consumer dissatisfaction (given their single period setting), and therefore
the return policy effectively becomes a tool to discourage consumers from returning,
in order to maximize short-term profits. Our findings help explain why full refunds
are observed in competitive retail markets.
Aside from Shulman et al. (2011), Chesnokova (2007) considers a duopoly
where the firms engage in a product reliability and price competition, and returns are
in the form of repairs, not refunds; i.e., the source of returns in her model is product
reliability, and not consumer tastes and preferences as in our model. In the context
of experience goods, Doganoglu (2010), Villas-Boas (2006) and Villas-Boas (2004)
study the price competition of two sellers over an infinite horizon; however, neither
paper considers return policies or pre-purchase information provision. We study a
duopoly case where two identical sellers engage in return policy and information
competition over two periods; this is the first scholarly work to our knowledge to
study the effects of competition on seller decisions on return policies and provision
of information.
3.3 Competition Model
We build the competition setting on the same framework as described in Section 2.3
in Essay 2. Specifically, we conceptualize a consumer’s valuation of a product as a
learning process, given information of amount α ∈ [0, 1] by a seller. Further given a
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return policy with a refund factor of β ∈ (0, 1], such that the refund amount is pβ
where p is the purchase price, each consumer has the opportunity to re-consider her
initial purchase decision. As in Essay (2), we assume costless information provision
in our analysis, and we later comment on the impact of costly information provision.
We consider a duopoly case with identical sellers, Y and Z; sellers have identi-
cal unit costs c, net salvage values s, and market growth rates g, and they introduce
new products at the same time. We assume that consumers equally value the prod-
ucts from both sellers; that is, the products are perfect substitutes of each other. In
other words, there is a single, seller-independent distribution F , of consumer valua-
tions V , which we assume to be uniformly distributed: F (p) = p. We further assume
identical period prices, p1 and p2, for both sellers. While we do not assume identi-
cal products, we assume that information provided by a seller on her product does
not contribute to information on the other seller’s product; while this assumption
does not hold in general, it is valid for many—if not all—experience goods 4. These
assumptions help us focus on information and return policy (α and β) competition,
as well as allowing a tractable solution.
We employ the same two-period setting as in the monopoly case, with the
chronology of events shown in Figure 2.2 in Essay 2. As in the monopoly case, we
assume that consumers attain full information on the products in the second period,
regardless of the information provided in the first period. At the start of the first
4Consider for example two electric razors of different brands. Even after having used one of
them, a consumer would have no understanding regarding how well the other product will perform,
how comfortable it will feel in his hand, how comfortable a shave it will provide, etc.
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period, the sellers simultaneously decide on their respective α and β. In the first
period, we assume a unit market size, which is shared between the sellers according
to consumer valuations given the sellers’ α and β decisions. Specifically, a consumer
with ex-post valuation v perceives ex-ante valuations of vα,Y and vα,Z for the sellers’
products, and since prices are equal, chooses the seller with the larger vα,j, where
vα,j = αjv + (1− αj)E[max{V, p1βj}]




for uniform valuations. In the second period, the market size for each seller grows
with rate g in the same manner as in the monopoly case: Consumers who are
dissatisfied or who return their purchases in the first period do not contribute to
market growth. Therefore, similarly, we refer to g as “misfit penalty.”
3.3.1 Market Share Dynamics
In preparation for the equilibrium analysis, we here analyze the market share dynam-
ics given the sellers’ α and β decisions. Suppose first that αY = αZ . If αY = αZ < 1
and if, without loss of generality, βZ > βY , then vα,Z > vα,Y , ∀v. That is, in the
case of symmetric, partial information, the seller offering a more lenient return pol-
icy captures the whole market. If αY = αZ = 1, then vα,Y = vα,Z , ∀v; if both sellers
provide full information, then the consumers are indifferent between the sellers re-
gardless of the return policies. Suppose without loss of generality that αY < αZ .
Then, there is a threshold valuation, vY Zθ , such that all consumers with v > v
Y Z
θ




(1− αY )(1 + (p1βY )2)− (1− αZ)(1 + (p1βZ)2)
2(αZ − αY )
. (3.1)
Therefore, the first-period market share for seller Y is vY Zθ ; for seller Z, it is (1−vY Zθ ).
If βY = βZ = β, we have v
Y Z
θ = E[max{V, p1β}]; that is, in case of identical return
policies, the threshold valuation is independent of the level of information provided
as long as αY 6= αZ .
Further analysis of the market share dynamics reveals that the seller with a
more lenient return policy can set an appropriate level of information to achieve a
desired market share. Consequently, she can set an appropriate level of information
to achieve 100% market share, that is, drive the other seller out of the market. This
is formalized in Proposition 7 below.
Proposition 7 Suppose, without loss of generality, that αY < 1 and let Z be the
seller offering a more lenient return policy, i.e., βZ > βY . Then, seller Z can
achieve a desired market share, v̂, by setting αZ = αv̂, where




2v̂ + (p1βZ)2 − 1
.
















Proof See Appendix C.
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Regardless of how the market is shared, the dynamics between the consumer
and the seller is identical to the monopoly case: Given that a consumer prefers
seller Z (v > vY Zθ ), he purchases only if vα,Z ≥ p1, or equivalently if v ≥ vθ,Z .
If p1βZ ≤ v < p1, he is unhappy with the purchase but is not willing to return;
if v < p1βZ , he is unhappy and would like to return. Therefore, all the findings
regarding the structure of the (α, β) decision space carries on from the monopoly
case. Furthermore, since we assume equal first-period prices, unit costs and net
salvage values, the sellers have identical (α, β) decision spaces.
3.4 (α, β) Equilibrium
In this section, we analyze the sellers’ (α, β) decision space in the light of the results
for the monopoly case and the analysis of market shares above, in order to identify
the possible Nash equilibria. In other words, we investigate whether and when there
exists a pair of decisions (αY , βY ) and (αZ , βZ) such that the former is seller Y ’s best
response to the latter, which in turn is seller Z’s best response to the former. When
a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium does not exist, we identify the mixed-strategy
equilibrium. The intuitive corollary of Proposition 7 suggests the non-existence of
a Nash equilibrium where both sellers set (αj < 1, βj < 1), since given, without loss
of generality, (αY < 1, βY < 1), seller Z has a potential best response where she sets
a more lenient return policy and an appropriate level of information to capture the
whole market. In fact, we find that capturing the whole market is the best response
to (αY < 1, βY < 1), and we summarize our findings in Proposition 8 below.
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Proposition 8 In the duopoly where both sellers have identical p1, p2, c, s and g,
and consumer valuations are uniformly distributed, we identify four thresholds on g
(as functions of other variables) that are critical for the existence and the form of






θ . Furthermore, we find that the ordering
of these functions is determined by the value of s compared to a threshold function
sθ. Specifically, the potential (α, β) Nash equilibria and the associated conditions for
their existence are as follows.





(i) If g < ḡIIIθ , then there is a symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
where both sellers provide no information but offer full refund return
policy: (αj = 0, βj = 1) for both sellers,
(ii) If ḡIIIθ < g < g
V
θ , there is no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. There is a
mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium where both sellers set βj = 1 and pick
α ∈ [0, 1] randomly,
(iii) If g > gVθ , there is no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. There is a mixed-
strategy Nash equilibrium where both sellers set βj = 1 and pick α ∈
[α̂, 1] randomly;









(i) If g < gVθ , then there is a symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
where both sellers provide no information but offer full refund return
policy: (αj = 0, βj = 1) for both sellers,
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(ii) If gVθ < g < g
V I
θ , then there is an asymmetric pure-strategy Nash equilib-
rium where one seller provides full information and offers an arbitrary
return policy, while the other seller provides no information but offers a
full refund return policy: without loss of generality, (αY = 1, βY ∈ [0, 1])
and (αZ = 0, βZ = 1),
(iii) If gV Iθ < g < g
IV
θ , then there is a symmetric pure-strategy Nash equi-
librium where both sellers provide full information and offer arbitrary
return policies: (αj = 1, βj ∈ [0, 1]) for both sellers,
(iv) If g > gIVθ , there is no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. There is a mixed-
strategy Nash equilibrium where both sellers set βj = 1 and pick α ∈
[α̂, 1] randomly,
where








(p2 − c)(1− p2)
,
gIVθ =
(p1 − c)(1− p1)
p1(p2 − c)(1− p2)
,
gVθ =
s− p1(1− p1 + c)
(1− p1)(p2 − c)(1− p2)
,
gV Iθ =
2s− c− p1(1− p1 + c)




(1− p1)2(g(1− p2)(p2 − c) + c− s)
(c− s)(1− p1)2 − 2p1(1− p1)(p1 − c) + g(1− p2)(p2 − c)(1− 2p1 + 3p21)
.
Proof See Appendix C.
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We see from Proposition 8 that for sufficiently small misfit penalty, g, both
sellers find it the best decision to provide no information to sell to all consumers and
share the market equally, although there are some dissatisfied consumers as well as
some returns. Moreover, we observe that as the salvage value increases, the range of
g, where providing no information is the best decision, grows. Both of these results
are consistent with the monopoly case (Proposition 5).
We observe that for sufficiently large misfit penalty (g > ḡIIIθ for s > sθ, and
g > gIVθ for s < sθ), there is no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium since both sellers
always find a best response where they capture the whole market alone. The mixed-
strategy equilibrium we identify for s > sθ and ḡ
III
θ < g < g
V
θ suggests that both
sellers offer full refunds and pick α randomly in [0, 1]. The second mixed-strategy
Nash equilibrium suggests that for sufficiently large g, both sellers’ best decision
is to offer full refunds and provide at least partial information; they randomly set
an information level between α = α̂ and α = 1. This means that for sufficiently
large g, it is not a best decision to provide little or no information; a result that is
consistent with the monopoly case. Both mixed-strategy equilibria suggest that the
market is not necessarily covered in the first period (i.e., there are some consumers
who leave without purchasing), since full market coverage requires αj ≤ α(vθ = 0)
for at least one of the sellers and this is not necessarily the case. Furthermore,
recalling that for a monopoly, the optimal decision given β = 1 and g > ḡIIIθ is to
provide full information, so that there are no dissatisfied consumers, we note that
both mixed-strategy equilibria imply partial information, resulting in sub-optimal
outcomes where there are some dissatisfied consumers and some returns.
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For sufficiently small net salvage value, s < sθ, intermediary misfit penalty
values result in two different pure-strategy Nash equilibria. In the lower g range
(gVθ < g < g
V I
θ ), one seller provides full information and offers an arbitrary return
policy, while the other provides no information but offers a full refund return policy.
This implies full market coverage in the first period (i.e., all consumers purchase),
and a market allocation such that one seller serves the consumers with higher val-
uations and sees no dissatisfied consumers and no returns, while the other seller
serves the remainders and sees some dissatisfied consumers and some returns. This
is an interesting result given that the sellers are identical. In the higher g range
(gV Iθ < g < g
IV
θ ), both sellers provide full information and offer arbitrary return
policies. In this case, while consumers are indifferent between the sellers, only the
consumers with ex-post valuations at least as high p1 purchase in the first period
and there is ex-ante efficient allocation of the goods.
We note that costly information provision may significantly alter the Nash
equilibria, even if the sellers would have the identical cost structure. For example,
it is conceivable that in the mixed-strategy equilibria described above, the range
for α would be capped from above since neither seller would have an incentive to
incur high information provision costs. Furthermore, the pure-strategy equilibria
where one or both sellers provide full information, α = 1, may not exist; in that
case, a mixed-strategy equilibrium where both sellers offer full refunds, β = 1, with
α randomized over a range may prevail.
Regarding the refund factor, β, recall that in the monopoly solution described
in Proposition 5, full refunds are never exercised; Solution (D) suggests partial
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refunds, and when Solution (E) is optimal, amount of refund is arbitrary. However,
we see from Proposition 8 that competition changes the picture abruptly. In the
duopoly case, all but one Nash equilibria suggest that at least one seller offers full
refunds; for s < sθ and g
V I
θ < g < g
IV
θ , both sellers provide full information and the
refund amount becomes arbitrary.
Consequently, we conclude, contrasting with the monopoly case, that while
competition results in one or both of the sellers withholding information from con-
sumers in certain cases, it typically forces them to offer full refunds. That helps
explain why we observe full refunds in practice (e.g., Nordstrom.)
3.5 Conclusion
In this essay, we study competition in the context of information provision and return
policies in experience good markets. In order to isolate the effects of competition
on our results in the monopoly model given in Essay 2, we consider a duopoly
case where two identical sellers engage in information provision and return policy
competition. We identify the possible pure-strategy Nash equilibria, or if none exists,
the mixed-strategy Nash equilibria, and the associated conditions where they take
place. We find, in contrast to the monopoly case, that while competition can cause
the sellers to withhold information under certain conditions, it typically forces them
to offer full-refund return policies. This finding can shed light on some real-life
phenomena where sellers offer full refunds and/or they do not put much effort to
provide informational tools to consumers.
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Appendix A
Appendix for Essay 1
A.1 Derivation of h(γ)
Let Rit denote the reservation price for product i at time t, a random variable. We
write R1t = u(Ω)ε1t, where u(·) is a (deterministic) linear mapping function and ε1t
is a random variable with a Weibull distribution (so that Rit has a Weibull distribu-
tion); similarly R2t = u((1+γ)Ω)ε2t. We define customer utility Vit as a log function
of the customer’s reservation price Vit = ln(Rit) = ln(u(Ω)) + ln(εit). Because εit
has a Weibull distribution, Vit has a Gumbel distribution; this is consistent with the












A.2 Proof of Proposition 1




















This is a simple optimal control problem, with the first-order necessary condition
given in (1.7). The solution is similar to that found in Bitran and Mondschein




to be an increasing function of p2(t) since lim
p2(t)→∞






















A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
We show through fluid approximations (Mandelbaum and Pats 1998) that the solu-
tions to the deterministic version of (1.5) is asymptotically optimal as initial max-
imum arrival rate, M0, and I0 grow proportionally large. However, since I0 is a
decision variable, we first show that it is optimal to select I0 proportionally large as
M0.
Consider a sequence of instances of problem (1.5) indexed by n ∈ Z+. Let
Mn0 denote the initial maximum arrival rate and λ
jn
1 be the resulting arrival rate













Let In0 be the decision parameter for the final build and I
n(t) denote the
corresponding inventory trajectory for the nth instance, and let all other parameters





































where we wrote I(T j) > 0 as −
∫ T j
ατ
dI(t) 6 I0. After dividing the second constraint





















































































Suppose (I∗0 , p
∗
1) is an optimal solution to (1.5), with the optimal objective




1) is an optimal solution to (A.4) with the objective













respectively. This follows by observing that (A.4) is equivalent to problem (1.5)
divided by n and taking limits as n → ∞. As a result, we have shown that it is
optimal to let the final build, I0, grow proportionally large as M0 in the asymptotic
regime.
Noting that the demand intensity process∫ t
ατ
λj1(u)Ḡ1u(p1)du
is continuous and uniformly bounded in [ατ, T j], and we find that in the limit as
n→∞, In(t)/n converges (almost surely and uniformly over a compact set) to I(t),
given by




Further details regarding the proof of this convergence result can be found
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in Mandelbaum and Pats (1998). In this asymptotic regime, the stochastic opti-




dI(t) is replaced with I(T j), and the second constraint is substituted into
the first term in the objective function.
The solution to (1.8) can be found as follows. Treating I(t) as the state variable
and p1(t) as the control variable, and letting ν and ω(t) be the multipliers for the
first and second constraints in (1.8), the Hamiltonian is H = e−δ(t−ατ)(λj1Ḡ1tp1 −






















ω(T j) = ν + e−δ(T
j−ατ)cs and νI(T
j) = 0. (A.7)
A first-order condition for I0 is obtained by considering that the marginal
revenue from the last unit must equal to its marginal cost (including the procurement
cost and cumulative holding costs in time). That is,




Combining (A.7) and (A.8), we get
ν = cp + ch
∫ T j
ατ
e−δ(u−ατ)du− e−δ(T j−ατ)cs. (A.9)
However, we must have ν > 0, otherwise I0 → ∞ is optimal and the problem in
(1.8) is unbounded. Therefore, from (A.7), I(T j) = 0. In other words, the entire
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On the other hand, (A.7) and (A.8) yield




We combine (A.10) and (A.11) to obtain the necessary condition for the optimal
price pattern for product 1, given in (1.9). The proof of uniqueness follows the same
steps as in the proof for Proposition 1.
Once the optimal price path is determined using (1.9), and given that I(T j) =
0, the optimal initial inventory is equal to the total sales through the planning
horizon.
A.4 Normalization of φ for the Regression
We normalize the parameter φ, for the purposes of running the regression, so that it
takes values between 0 and 1, instead of between 0 and ∞. We do this by mapping
φ to a new parameter θ, according to the normalizing relationship:










where W(·) is the Lambert W function. The Lambert W function is the inverse of
f(w) = wew and we use the zeroth branch which is single valued and real for the
range of θ considered. It is easily verified that lim
φ→∞




Table A.1: Statistics of multiple linear regression: Two-way interaction effects.
Factor t-value
(intercept) -2.7 ∗∗
τ -60.9 ∗ ∗ ∗
α 9.0 ∗ ∗ ∗
log(k) -3.8 ∗ ∗ ∗
µ 35.3 ∗ ∗ ∗
γ -35.7 ∗ ∗ ∗
p+ q -43.7 ∗ ∗ ∗
log(q/p) 68.3 ∗ ∗ ∗
φ -94.5 ∗ ∗ ∗
τ : α -20.9 ∗ ∗ ∗
τ : log(k) -17.7 ∗ ∗ ∗
τ : µ -1.8 ◦
τ : γ -35.0 ∗ ∗ ∗
τ : p+ q -30.4 ∗ ∗ ∗
τ : log(q/p) 25.1 ∗ ∗ ∗
τ : φ -48.1 ∗ ∗ ∗
α : log(k) 1.9 ◦
α : µ 6.3 ∗ ∗ ∗
α : γ -12.0 ∗ ∗ ∗
α : p+ q -20.0 ∗ ∗ ∗
α : log(q/p) 30.7 ∗ ∗ ∗
α : φ -9.5 ∗ ∗ ∗
log(k) : µ 10.0 ∗ ∗ ∗
log(k) : γ -10.3 ∗ ∗ ∗
log(k) : p+ q -11.3 ∗ ∗ ∗
log(k) : log(q/p) 17.7 ∗ ∗ ∗
log(k) : φ -24.4 ∗ ∗ ∗
µ : γ -4.0 ∗ ∗ ∗
µ : p+ q -11.2 ∗ ∗ ∗
µ : log(q/p) 15.7 ∗ ∗ ∗
µ : φ -21.9 ∗ ∗ ∗
γ : p+ q -16.3 ∗ ∗ ∗
γ : log(q/p) 25.8 ∗ ∗ ∗
γ : φ -35.2 ∗ ∗ ∗
p+ q : log(q/p) -6.3 ∗ ∗ ∗
p+ q : φ -4.2 ∗ ∗ ∗
log(q/p) : φ -6.0 ∗ ∗ ∗
Adj. R-sq. 0.837
Statistical significance codes: ‘∗ ∗ ∗’: p ≈ 0; ‘∗∗’: 0.001 < p < 0.01; ‘◦’: 0.05 < p < 0.1
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Appendix B
Appendix for Essay 2
B.1 Proof of Proposition 3
Under partial information, using the definition of vθ, the condition vθ = p1 translates
to p1 = E[max{V, p1β}]. Suppose that p1 ≥ E[V ]. Then, since p1 ≤ E[max{V, p1}]
and through the intermediate value theorem, there exists βp ∈ [0, 1] such that p1 =
E[max{V, p1βp}]. Note that if p1 < E[V ], no such βp ∈ [0, 1] exists and there are
no first period buyers with positive surplus for α < 1. Thus, if p1 ≥ E[V ], setting
β = βp is equivalent to providing full information as it completely nullifies the
consequences of valuation uncertainty regardless of the value of α.
B.2 Structural Properties of the (α, β) Decision Space
B.2.1 Boundary for Returns: vθ (α, β) = p1β
The condition vθ (α, β) = p1β is critical for the existence of returns. Assuming
α > 0, this condition is equivalent to p1 +
(1−α)
α
(p1 − E[max{V, p1β}]) = p1β, which
reduces to




Note that, given p1, this equation represents a curve in the (α, β) space. Sup-





(p1 − E[max{V, p1β}]) > 0. Furthermore, αr(β) > 0 if and and only if
β > βp, since the denominator in αr(β) is always positive. Thus, vθ (α, β) < p1β
if and only if α < αr(β). Finally, αr(β) is strictly convex and increasing, since








(2(1−F (p1β))(E[max{V,p1β}]−p1+p1(1−β)F (p1β))+p1(1−β)(E[max{V,p1β}]−p1)F ′(p1β))
(E[max{V,p1β}]−p1β)3
> 0
for all β > βp. Suppose p1 < E[V ]. Then, we have
∂vθ
∂α







> 0 satisfied for all β ∈ [0, 1].
B.2.2 Boundary for 100% Sales: vθ (α, β) = 0
The condition vθ (α, β) = 0 reduces to




Similar to above, when p1 ≥ E[V ], βp ≥ 0 exists and for β > βp, α0(β) > 0 is well
defined and we have ∂vθ
∂α
> 0. Finally, the function α0(β) is strictly increasing if F





> 0. If p1 < E[V ], then we
have ∂vθ
∂α
> 0, α0(β) > 0 and
dα0
dβ
> 0 for all β ∈ [0, 1].
B.2.3 Boundary for No Sales: vθ (α, β) = 1
Note that vθ (α, β) = 1 is possible only if p1 > E[V ], and it reduces to
α = α1(β) ,
p1 − E[max{V, p1β}]
1− E[max{V, p1β}]
.
Then, it is seen that α1(β) > 0 only if 0 ≤ β < βp. On the other hand, we
have ∂vθ
∂α
< 0 for all β < βp; hence, vθ (α, β) > 1 for all β ∈ (0, βp) and α <
α1(β). Finally, for a continuously differentiable F ,
dα1
dβ










< 0; therefore, α1(β) is strictly
concave and decreasing in β.
B.2.4 Redundant Regions
We observe that two regions are rendered redundant in our model with the assump-
tion of costless information. First, note the region where α < α0(β). By defini-
tion, any (α, β) pair in this region results in vθ < 0; all consumers purchase since
v ∈ (0, 1). Furthermore, this result is also achieved with no information (α = 0),
as long as β > βp; when β > βp, we have v0 = E[max{V, p1β}] > p1 by definition.
Therefore, for a given β > βp, the seller is indifferent in choosing an α ∈ [0, α0(β)]
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when information is costless. Consequently, in our analyses in this study, we treat
the conditions vθ = 0 and α = 0 as equal at a given β > βp.
Similarly, the second region is where α < α1(β), for which vθ > 1; there are
no sales since consumer valuations are in (0, 1). We see that “no sales” is achieved
for any α ∈ [0, α1(β)], which is possible for β < βp.
B.3 Analysis of the α, β Decision Space
B.3.1 Ex-Ante Efficient Market: vθ = p1
When vθ = p1, there are no dissatisfied consumers and there are no returns; i.e.,
L = M = 0. Then, the seller’s optimization problem takes the following form, where
we name the region where vθ = p1 as Region (E):
max
α,β,pi
RE = (p1 − c) (1− F (p1)) + (p2 − c) g (1− F (p2))
s.t. vθ = p1
(B.1)
The optimal prices are determined as p∗1 = p
∗
2 = arg max
p
(p− c) (1− F (p)).
Since the objective function does not include α or β, the seller is indifferent in
choosing them as long as they satisfy vθ = p1. We name this as Solution (E).
B.3.2 Positive Consumer Surplus: vθ > p1
Regardless of the value of α ∈ (0, 1), all buyers have strictly positive surplus when
β < βp since v
I
θ > p1; we name this region as Region (I). In other words, under
partial information, setting a stringent returns policy scares away some consumers




RI = (p1 − c) (1− F (vθ)) + (p2 − c) g (1− F (p2))
s.t. vθ > p1
(B.2)
We observe that ∂R
I
∂vθ
= −F ′(vθ) (p1 − c) < 0; it is optimal to decrease the
purchasing threshold at any price point. We conclude that any (α, β) decision in
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Region (I) is strictly dominated by Region (E) since vEθ = p1 < v
I
θ ; the seller never
lets the consumers have positive surplus while there is an option to have efficient
allocation.
B.3.3 Some Dissatisfied Consumers, No Returns: p1 > vθ ≥ p1β
In the region where p1 > vθ ≥ p1β, Region (II), there are some dissatisfied buyers
but they are not willing to return their items as the refund amount is not high
enough. We have L = F (p1) − F (vθ), and since there are no returns, M = 0.
Seller’s profit maximization problem in this region is
max
α,β,pi
RII = (p1 − c) (1− F (vθ)) + (p2 − c) g (1− F (p2)) (1− F (p1) + F (vθ))
s.t. p1 > vθ ≥ p1β
(B.3)





−p1 + c+ g (p2 − c) (1− F (p2))
)
which is positive for
g > gIIθ ,
(p1 − c)
(p2 − c) (1− F (p2))
, (B.4)
and negative for g < gIIθ . Then, at any given price point (p1, p2), it is optimal to
increase vθ if g > g
II
θ and it is optimal to decrease vθ if g < g
II
θ . Therefore, if g > g
II
θ ,
Region (II) is dominated by Region (E) since vEθ = p1 > v
II
θ ; if g < g
II
θ , Region (II)
is dominated by the boundary where vθ = p1β. As a result, no internal solution is
optimal in Region (II).
B.3.4 Some Dissatisfied Consumers, Some Returns: vθ < p1β
Region (III) is characterized by vIIIθ < p1β, which means there are some dissatisfied
consumers (L = F (p1) − F (vθ)) and a portion (M = F (p1β) − F (vθ)) of these
consumers are willing to return their purchases. Thus, the seller’s optimization
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problem in this region is as follows:
max
α,β,pi
RIII = (p1 − c) (1− F (vθ)) + (−p1β + s) (F (p1β)− F (vθ))
+ g (p2 − c) (1− F (p2)) (1− F (p1) + F (vθ))
s.t. vθ < p1β
(B.5)
In order to solve this problem, we look at the partial derivative of the objective





−p1+c+p1β−s+g (p2 − c) (1− F (p2))
)
which is positive if
g > gIIIθ ,
((p1 − c) + (s− p1β))
(p2 − c) (1− F (p2))
(B.6)




θ > 0, if g > g
III
θ , Region (II)
dominates Region (III), and if g < gIIIθ , the boundary where vθ = 0 dominates
Region (III). We name the part of this boundary region where β > s
p1
as Region (B)
and the part where β ≤ s
p1
as Region (D).
Note that if β > s
p1
then gIIIθ < g
II
θ , and if β <
s
p1
then gIIIθ > g
II
θ . Therefore,
combining our results so far for Regions (II) and (III), for β < s
p1
, there is a range
gIIθ < g < g
III
θ where Region (E) dominates Region (II) and Region (D) dominates
Region (III) and however it is not obvious which one of the two dominates the other.
In order to identify the threshold g value, we write the profit functions for the two
regions equal, RE = RD, and solve for g;
gEθ ,
(
(p1 − c) + (s− p1β)F (p1β)F (p1)
)








, we conclude that Region (E) dominates Region
(D) if g > gEθ . Note that for β <
s
p1




θ ; wherever Region (E)
dominates Region (D), it dominates all other regions, and wherever Region (D)
dominates Region (E), it dominates all other regions.
The following summarizes our findings in determining the optimal region in
the (α, β) decision space given β, p1, p2, c, s, and g.
1. For β > s
p1




(i) If g > gIIθ , then Region (E) dominates all regions; it is optimal to set
α = 1.
(ii) If gIIIθ < g < g
II
θ , then the boundary region between Regions (II) and
(III) where vθ = p1β, Region (A), dominates all regions.
(iii) If g < gIIIθ , then Region (B) dominates all regions.
2. For β ≤ s
p1
, we have gIIIθ ≥ gEθ ≥ gIIθ , and
(i) If g > gEθ , then Region (E) dominates all regions.
(ii) If g < gEθ , then Region (D) dominates all regions.
We see that there are four candidate regions (A, B, D and E) for optimality.
Figure B.1 gives an illustration of these regions for a specific case. Note again that
the findings above are for given β, p1, p2, c, s, and g values and point to the best α
decision depending on the relationships between these “parameters”. For example,
consider a price taking seller for whom the restocking fee, hence β, is also dictated by
either the industry or some trade regulations. Then, the above rules apply directly
























Figure B.1: Candidate regions for optimality for V ∼ U(0, 1), p1 = 0.51 and s = 0.4.
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We continue our analysis considering a seller who can set all α, β and p1 freely,
and use the above rules as a guideline to find the optimum strategy.
B.4 Analysis of Candidate Regions and Proof of Proposition 5
B.4.1 Region (A)
We start with looking at Region (A), which is optimal if gIIIθ < g < g
II
θ , which is
in turn possible if β > s
p1
. Plugging in the defining constraint, vθ = p1β, to the






−p1 + c+ g (p2 − c) (1− F (p2))
)
,
which is negative for g < gIIθ . Therefore, it is optimal to decrease β in Region (A),
where sup(β) = s
p1
. As a result, setting β = s
p1
and α such that vθ = p1β dominates
Region (A). However, from the discussion above, when β = s
p1
, Region (D), where
vθ = 0, is optimal. This therefore establishes that Region (D) dominates Region
(A).
B.4.2 Regions (B) and (D)
We collectively represent Regions (B) and (D) as vθ = 0. Thus, the objective
function for these regions is
RB,D = (p1 − c) + (−p1β + s)F (p1β) + g (p2 − c) (1− F (p2)) (1− F (p1)) .
The first order condition (FOC) for β is
∂RB,D
∂β











Note that since the second term on the right is positive, at optimality, we
have β∗ < s
p1
. This means that Region (D) dominates Region (B) since the latter is




Combining our results so far, we see that when g < gIIθ , it is never optimal to
have β > s
p1
; Region (D) dominates both Regions (A) and (B). Therefore, we have
two candidate optimal solutions left: Solution (D), which is defined by vθ = 0 (or
equivalently, α ∈ [0, α0(β)], as shown above) and the FOC given in Equation B.8,
and Solution (E) which is defined by vθ = p1. This constitutes the proof of Propo-
sition 5.
B.5 Proof of Proposition 6
From the analysis of the structural properties of seller’s (α, β) decision space, we
know that changing p1 changes the (α, β) decision space as all the critical boundaries
is a function of p1. Therefore, when p1 is a decision variable as well, the seller has the
tool to change the (α, β) decision space in order to maximize her profits. Considering
this, we observe that the point β = s
p1
on Region (D) structurally changes the profit
function when solving for the optimal p1; when β =
s
p1
, refund is equal to salvage
value and each return has zero net after-sales revenue. Therefore, we take this point
explicitly and define Region (C): {α = 0, β = s
p1
}. Profits for Region (C) is given
by RC = (p1 − c) + g (p2 − c) (1− F (p2)) (1− F (p1)). Since Region (C) is a single
point on the (α, β) decision space, the seller’s profits here is a function of only the
prices.
In the following, we solve for the optimal α, β, p1 and p2 for each of the
regions (C), (D), (E), and we identify the optimal strategy for uniformly distributed
consumer valuations; F (p) = p. Using Proposition 4, the optimal second period
price is p∗2 = (1 + c)/2 for all regions.
B.5.1 Region (C)




= 1 − g (p2 − c) (1− p2), which is positive for g < gEθ . Recall
that Region (C) is optimal only if g < gEθ ; thus, it is optimal to increase p1 as




for Region (C), the largest value that p1 can attain is determined by the
smallest value that β can take, which is equal to βp. With uniform valuations, we
have E[max{V, p1β}] = 1+(p1β)
2
2
, and we find that




from Proposition 3. Therefore, the optimal price should satisfy
√
2p1 − 1 = s, and
it yields p∗1 =
1+s2
2





a result, recalling that α = 0 in Region (C) by definition, Solution (C) is given by






























Note that β∗ = 2s
1+s2
< 1 for all s < 1; it is not optimal to offer full refunds when
Solution (C) is optimal.
B.5.2 Region (D)
With uniform valuations, the FOC for β yields β = s
2p1
in Region (D). Plugging this











1 − g (p2 − c) (1− p2). Therefore, profits are increasing in p1 for g < gEθ , for which
Region (D) is optimal; i.e., it is optimal to increase p1 as high as possible in Region
(D). Given the FOC for β, the highest value for p1 is determined by lowest value of




. Therefore, the optimal price should satisfy p1βp =
√
2p1 − 1 = s2 , which yields p∗1 = 4+s
2
8





Then, these values constitute Solution (D),































Note that β∗ = 4s
4+s2




Given that V ∼ U(0, 1), the optimal pricing decision in Region (E) is p∗1 = p∗2 = (1+c)2 .




(1− c)2(1 + g).
As we pointed out above, the seller is indifferent in deciding on an (α, β) point in
Region (E), or more formally, in choosing between (α∗ = 1, β∗ ∈ [0, 1]), and given
p1 > E[V ], (α





B.5.4 Deriving the Optimal Strategy
To summarize our analysis above, there are three solutions that the seller can choose
among, depending on the parameters incorporated in this study:












, with profits RC∗.












, with profits RD∗.
Solution (E): (α∗, β∗) = {(α, β) | vθ = p∗1}, p∗1 = p∗2 = (1+c)2 , with profits RE∗.
In order to determine the ultimate optimal strategy, we conduct a three-way
comparison of the net profits offered by these optimal solutions. First, we find the
thresholds on g by conducting three pairwise comparisons between the above net
profits. That is, we determine gi,jθ as a function of c and s by setting R
i∗ = Rj∗ and





4(1 + s2)− 2(1 + c)2)
(1 + s2)(1− c)2 ,
gE,Dθ =
4 + 12(1 + s2)− 8(1 + c)2
(4 + s2)(1− c)2 .
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(1− c)2(4 + s2) > 0,
establishing that Solution (i) is preferred to Solution (j) if g > gi,jθ , and Solution (j)
is preferred to Solution (i) if g < gi,jθ . However, this gives only a partial ordering;
in order to develop a full ordering, we seek the ordering of these thresholds on g.
Pairwise comparisons of these thresholds show that there is a critical c value that


















4(1 + s2)(1 + c)








4(4 + s2)(1 + c)








s2(4 + s2)(1 + c)
(1 + s2)(4 + 3s2 − 2(1 + c)2)2 > 0.











θ . Proposition 6 follows by observing the ordering of solutions
(C), (D) and (E) with respect to g, which is depicted in Figure B.2.
B.6 On the Value of Optimal Refund Amount
It is interesting to investigate if the “refund amount” exceeds the salvage value or
not: does the seller allow returns even when they have negative net revenues? By
definition, Solutions (C) and (D) do not offer a refund amount more than the salvage














Solution (D) is optimalSolution (C) is optimal Solution (E) is optimal
g
Region 1 :c≥c s 
Region 2: cc s
Figure B.2: Ordering of solutions according to the the regions in Figure 2.6.
In case of Solution (E), if the seller provides full information, there are no
returns and the seller can “advertise” any return policy. On the other hand, if she








2p∗1 − 1 =
√
c. Therefore, the seller can advertise a refund amount
of more than the salvage value if
√
c > s, or c > s2. However, since Solution (E)
does not actually exercise returns, we conclude that a refund amount of more than
the salvage value is never exercised.
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Appendix C
Appendix for Essay 3
C.1 Proof of Proposition 7
Suppose, without loss of generality, that αZ > αY . Then, the condition for seller Z
capturing the whole market is vY Zθ = 0. Solving from (3.1) for αZ that satisfies this,
we get
αZ = α , α(v
Y Z






Note that α > αY only if βZ > βY and αY < 1. Furthermore, we observe that
∂vY Zθ
∂αZ
= p21(1− αY )
β2Z − β2Y
2(αZ − αY )2
> 0
if βZ > βY and αY < 1. Then, any αZ < α results in v
Y Z
θ < 0, and thus seller Z
captures the whole market. Therefore, given αY < 1 and βZ > βY , αZ ∈ [αY , α]
results in seller Z capturing the whole market.
Suppose now that αZ < αY , which is possible only if αY > 0. In this case,
vZYθ is defined analogous to v
Y Z
θ in (3.1); all consumers with v > v
ZY
θ prefer seller
Y to seller Z, while those with v < vZYθ prefer seller Z to seller Y . Then, seller Z
captures the whole market if vZYθ = 1. Solving for αZ from (3.1), we find
αZ = α(v
ZY




Observe that α(vZYθ = 1) < αY as long as βZ > βY and αY < 1, and that α(v
ZY
θ =
1) > 0 as long as αY > 0. Moreover, we have
∂vZYθ
∂αZ




if βZ > βY and αY < 1. Then, any αZ > α(v
ZY
θ = 1) results in v
ZY
θ > 1, and
thus seller Z captures the whole market. This means, given that αY ∈ (0, 1) and
βZ > βY , αZ ∈ [α(vZYθ = 1), αY ] results in seller Z capturing the whole market, or
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given that αY = 0 and βZ > βY , αZ = 0 results in seller Z capturing the whole
market.
Combining the two results above, we conclude that given αY < 1, seller Z
captures the whole market if she sets βZ > βY and αZ such that αZ ∈ [α, α], where
α , max{0, α(vZYθ = 1)}.
Suppose seller Z would like to have only the consumers with valuation greater
than (1− v̂) prefer seller Z over seller Y ; that is she would like to have vY Zθ = 1− v̂.
From (3.1), we see that this is possible only if αZ > αY and solving for αZ , we find
αZ = αv̂ , α(v
Y Z
θ = 1− v̂) = αY + p21(1− αY )
β2Z − β2Y
2v̂ + (p1βZ)2 − 1
.
Then, seller Z can set βZ > βY and αZ = αv̂ > αY to attain v
Y Z
θ = 1 − v̂, as long
as αY < 1 and v̂ >
1−(p1βZ)2
2
. Note that vY Zθ = 1 − v̂ means seller Z has a market
share of 1− vY Zθ = v̂.
C.2 Proof of Proposition 8
Before we proceed with the proof, we note that the crucial aspect of the duopoly
case in this essay is that the market is being divided among the sellers, and that
there is no value creation as a result of competition. In other words, there are no
win-win scenarios and the game is rather close to a constant-sum game. In the light
of this observation and the market share dynamics described in Proposition 7, our
first intuition is that setting (αZ , βZ) to capture the whole market is a potential best
response of seller Z to seller Y ’s (αY < 1, βY < 1). Note that once seller Z captures
the whole market, she is effectively a monopoly and the results for the monopoly
case directly apply. Being a monopoly, seller Z clearly prefers to be at the monopoly
optimal solution described in Proposition 5 (recall that in the duopoly case, we as-
sume p1 and p2 are given, and therefore Proposition 5 applies). However, we see from
Proposition 7 that conditions for seller Z to become a monopoly is not arbitrary,
and that she is not necessarily able to attain the monopoly optimal solution while
becoming a monopoly. In the proof below, we first identify the cases where seller
Z can capture the whole market at the monopoly optimal solution. Then, we look
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at the remainder cases step-by-step and investigate whether capturing the whole
market is profitable given that monopoly optimal solution is not attainable. We ul-
timately find that under any condition, seller Z’s best response to (αY < 1, βY < 1)
is to appropriately set (αZ , βZ) to capture the whole market. Since the sellers are
identical in terms of p1, p2, c, s and g, we conclude that there is no Nash equilibrium
where a seller sets (αj < 1, βj < 1). Given this result, we analyze best responses in
the form of full refund (αj < 1, βj = 1) and full information (αY = 1, βY ∈ [0, 1]),
and identify the potential Nash equilibria and the associated conditions as given in
Proposition 8.
We start by summarizing Proposition 5 for uniformly distributed valuations:
The optimal (α, β) for a monopolistic seller when p1, p2, c, s and g are given is that
the seller chooses either Solution (D) if g < ḡEθ , or Solution (E) if g > ḡ
E
θ , where,
for uniformly distributed valuations,
Solution(D) : (α∗, β∗) =
{










Solution(E) : (α∗, β∗) = {(α, β) | vθ = p1} , and
ḡEθ =
p1 − c+ s
2
4p1
(p2 − c) (1− p2)
.
Suppose first that g > ḡEθ . Then, Solution (E) is optimal for a monopoly
seller and thus, her optimal decision is to set α and β such that vθ is as close
to p1 as possible. Therefore in the duopoly case, following Propositions 3 and
7, if g > ḡEθ , then the best response of seller Z to (αY < 1, βY < βp) is to set
(αZ ∈ [max{0, α(vZYθ = 1)}, α(vY Zθ = 0)], βZ = βp) achieving vθ,Z = p1 while
capturing the whole market. If βY ≥ βp, however, seller Z cannot capture the whole
market and set vθ,Z = p1 at the same time. However, from Proposition 7, if αY < 1,
she can achieve vY Zθ = p1 by setting βZ > βY and
αZ = α(v
Y Z




1 + (p1βZ)2 − 2p1
.
Note that, since βZ > βY ≥ βp, we have 1 + (p1βZ)2 − 2p1 > 0 and vθ,Z ≤ p1. By
setting vY Zθ = p1, seller Z ensures that only those consumers with valuation greater
96
than the price prefer seller Z over seller Y , and since vθ,Z ≤ p1, all such consumers
purchase from seller Z. In other words, seller Z achieves monopoly optimal profits.
We conclude, due to symmetry, that if g > ḡEθ , there is no equilibrium where a seller
sets (αj < 1, βj < 1), since the other seller can always capture the whole market
profitably.
Suppose that g < ḡEθ . In this case, we know that Solution (D) is optimal for a
monopoly seller, and that she would set α as low as possible so that she can sell to




Z can set βZ =
s
2p1
and αZ = max{0, α(vZYθ = 1)}, capturing the whole market
profitably. Therefore due to symmetry, if g < ḡEθ , there is no equilibrium where a









) for uniformly distributed








(p2 − c) (1− p2)





(p2 − c) (1− p2)
< 0
for all β > s
2p1









. As a corollary, if gIIθ < g < ḡ
E
θ , then there exists a critical return factor,
s
2p1
< β̂ < s
p1









θ < g < ḡ
E
θ .
Then, as long as s
2p1
< β ≤ β̂, we have g < gEθ (β), and following the results in
Appendix B, it is profitable for a monopoly seller to sell to all consumers. In other
words, in the duopoly case, a seller would like to decrease her α as much as possible
while capturing the whole market. Suppose (αY < 1, βY < β̂), then seller Z can set
(αZ = max{0, α(vZYθ = 1)}, βZ = β̂), and thus capture the whole market and sell to
as many consumers as possible. If (αY < 1, βY ≥ β̂), seller Z must offer βZ > βY ≥ β̂
in order to capture the whole market; however, for g > gIIθ and β > β̂, it is no longer
optimal to have any dissatisfied buyers for a monopoly. Therefore, while capturing
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the whole market, seller Z sets αZ = α(v
Y Z
θ = p1) and βZ > βY , achieving the
monopoly optimal profits; vY Zθ = p1 means all consumers with v > p1 prefer seller




exists βZ > βY such that 1 > α(v
Y Z
θ = p1) > αY , given that αY < 1 and βY < 1. As
a result, if gIIθ < g < ḡ
E
θ , and given that αY < 1, seller Z has a best response that
enables him to capture the whole market profitably for any βY < 1. We conclude
due to symmetry that if gIIθ < g < ḡ
E
θ , there is no equilibrium with (αj < 1, βj < 1)
for any seller.
So far we showed that if g > gIIθ , there is no Nash equilibrium where any seller
sets (αj < 1, βj < 1). Then, suppose that g < g
II
θ . Given this sufficiently small
g, it is optimal for a monopoly seller to sell to all consumers as long as β ≤ s
p1
.
Therefore in the duopoly case, as response to (αY < 1, βY <
s
p1
), seller Z can set
(αZ = max{0, α(vZYθ = 1)}, βZ = sp1 ), and thus capture the whole market selling
to as many consumers as possible. Due to symmetry, we conclude that if g < gIIθ ,
neither seller sets (αj < 1, βj <
s
p1
) in an equilibrium.
Now recall from (B.6) and the subsequent analysis in Appendix B that if
β > s
p1
, it is optimal for a monopoly seller to sell to all consumers as long as
gIIIθ > 0 and if g < g
III
θ . Since g
III
θ is decreasing in β, if g
III
θ (β = 1) > 0, then





) = gIIθ > 0, there is a
s
p1
< β̄ < 1
such that gIIIθ (β = β̄) = 0. Therefore, as long as max{0, gIIIθ (β = 1)} < g < gIIθ ,
there is a critical return factor, s
p1
< β̃ < min{1, β̄}, such that g = gIIIθ (β = β̃). In
other words, given max{0, gIIIθ (β = 1)} < g < gIIθ , it is profitable for a monopoly
seller to sell to all consumers as long as β ≤ β̃. Thus in the duopoly case, if
max{0, gIIIθ (β = 1)} < g < gIIθ , seller Z’s best response to (αY < 1, βY < β̃) is
to set (αZ = max{0, α(vZYθ = 1)}, βZ = β̃), capturing the whole market profitably.
Due to symmetry, we conclude that if max{0, gIIIθ (β = 1)} < g < gIIθ , there is no
equilibrium where a seller sets (αj < 1, βj < β̃).
Consider then (αY < 1, βY ≥ β̃) in case of max{0, gIIIθ (β = 1)} < g < gIIθ .
From Appendix B, for any given β > β̃, if max{0, gIIIθ (β = 1)} < g < gIIθ , a
monopoly seller would like to set vθ = p1β so that no buyer returns even though
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they may be dissatisfied. Thus, seller Z can set βZ > βY and
αZ = α(v
Y Z






ensuring that none of her buyers return while all (if any) buyers of seller Y return
their purchases. Note that given αY < 1 and βY < 1, there exists 1 > βZ > βY such
that 1 > α(vY Zθ = p1βZ) > αY . Therefore, due to symmetry, if max{0, gIIIθ (β =
1)} < g < gIIθ , there is no equilibrium where a seller sets (αj < 1, βj ≥ β̃). Com-
bining with the above result, we conclude that if max{0, gIIIθ (β = 1)} < g < gIIθ ,
neither seller sets (αj < 1, βj < 1) in an equilibrium.
Suppose ḡIIIθ , g
III
θ (β = 1) > 0, which translates to s > c. Then, if g < ḡ
III
θ ,
it is profitable for a monopoly seller to sell to all consumers for any β ∈ [0, 1]. Thus
in the duopoly case, in response to (αY < 1, βY < 1), seller Z can set βZ > βY
and αZ = max{0, α(vZYθ = 1)}, capturing the whole market and sell to as many
consumers as possible. Due to symmetry, we conclude that there is no equilibrium
where a seller sets (αj < 1, βj < 1) if 0 < g < ḡ
III
θ , which is possible only if s > c.
Combining our analysis so far, we established that for any value of g > 0
there is no Nash equilibrium where (αj < 1, βj < 1) for any seller. Then, consider
(αY < 1, βY = 1). In this case, seller Z’s best response is either (αZ < 1, βZ = 1),
or αZ = 1, βZ ∈ [0, 1]. Note that once αZ = 1, the value of βZ is irrelevant for both
sellers. Furthermore, as long as αZ > αY and βY = βZ = 1, the value of αZ is
irrelevant for both sellers and the value of αY is irrelevant for seller Z. Therefore,
essentially, seller Z has three potential best responses: 1) (αZ < αY , βZ = 1), 2)
(αZ = αY , βZ = 1), or 3) (αZ = 1, βZ ∈ [0, 1]). In the first, seller Z provides less
information than seller Y and we have vZYθ =
1+p21
2
> p1; in the second, seller Y
and seller Z are identical and they equally share the profits; in the third, seller Z
provides full information and we have vY Zθ =
1+p21
2
> p1. We write seller Z’s net
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profits under each decision as follows:






+ (s− p1)(p1 − vθ,Z)




− p1 + vθ,Z
)
,
RZ(αZ = αY , βj = 1) =
1
2
((p1 − c)(1− vθ,Y ) + (s− p1)(p1 − vθ,Y )
+g(p2 − c)(1− p2)(1− p1 + vθ,Y )) ,
RZ(αZ = 1, αY < 1, βY = 1) =(p1 − c)
(





+ g(p2 − c)(1− p2)
(






We observe from the profit function in the first case that seller Z would like
to increase vθ,Z as much as possible if g > ḡ
III
θ and would like to decrease it if
g < ḡIIIθ . Suppose g > ḡ
III
θ ; then seller Z’s optimal decision given αZ < αY is to
set αZ as close to αY as possible; we denote this by αZ / αY , and thus vθ,Z / vθ,Y
since βY = βZ = 1. Comparing the profits for the three decisions, we find that
RZ(αZ / αY , βZ = 1) > RZ(αZ = αY , βj = 1) > RZ(αZ = 1, αY < 1, βY = 1) if
g > gIVθ and vθ,Y > v̂θ, otherwise if g > g
IV
θ and vθ,Y < v̂θ, or if g < g
IV
θ , then
RZ(αZ / αY , βZ = 1) < RZ(αZ = αY , βj = 1) < RZ(αZ = 1, αY < 1, βY = 1),
where
v̂θ =
p1 (g(1− p1)(p2 − c)(1− p2) + p1(1− p1 + c)− s)




(p1 − c)(1− p1)
p1(p2 − c)(1− p2)
.
As a result, depending on the value of g and vθ,Y , and hence on αY , seller Z’s best
decision is either to set either αZ / αY or αZ > αY ; it is never the best decision to
provide the same level of information given that αY < 1. We observe from above




s− p1(1− p1 + c)
(1− p1)(p2 − c)(1− p2)
.
Furthermore, we find that ∂v̂θ
∂g
> 0 only if s > sθ, where


















θ . To sum, if s > sθ and ḡ
III
θ < g < g
V
θ , then seller Z’s best response
is αZ / αY for all αY < 1; if s > sθ and g > gVθ , then αZ / αY is the best response
if vθ,Y > v̂θ, and αZ > αY is the best response if vθ,Y < v̂θ. Suppose that we
have s > sθ and ḡ
III
θ < g < g
V
θ ; then, due to symmetry, there is no pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium where a seller sets αj < 1 because providing a marginally less
information than competition is always the best response for both sellers and there
is a continuum of such best responses.
Suppose that s > sθ and g > g
V
θ . Then, both sellers’ best response is to provide
marginally less information than the competition until, without loss of generality,
vθ,Z = v̂θ,Z , at which point seller Y ’s best response is αY = 1. Seller B’s best response
to αY = 1 is either (αZ / 1, βZ = 1) with profits RZ(αZ / αY = 1, βZ = 1), or
αZ = 1 with profits
RZ(αj = 1) =
1
2
((p1 − c)(1− p1) + g(p2 − c)(1− p2)) .
We find that RZ(αZ / αY = 1, βZ = 1) > RZ(αj = 1) only if g > gIVθ ; however,






θ . Therefore, if s > sθ and g > g
V
θ , seller Z’s
best response to αY = 1 is (αZ / 1, βZ = 1). Given (αZ / 1, βZ = 1), seller Y ’s best
response is (αY / αZ , βZ = 1) and the sellers are back in the loop of a continuous
series of best responses where they unilaterally deviate from an equilibrium. As a
result, there is no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium if s > sθ and g ≥ gVθ . Combined
with the above result, we conclude that if s > sθ and g > ḡ
III
θ , there is no pure-
strategy Nash equilibrium in the duopoly.
On the other hand, consider, for s > sθ and ḡ
III
θ < g < g
V
θ , the case where
seller Y sets βY = 1 and picks αY ∈ [0, 1] arbitrarily. Without knowing where seller
Y is located in terms of α, seller Z is forced to randomize his decision as well and her
best response is similarly to set βZ = 1 and choose αZ ∈ [0, 1] randomly. Therefore,
given s > sθ and ḡ
III
θ < g < g
V
θ , there is a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium where
both sellers set βj = 1, and pick αj ∈ [0, 1] randomly. Next, consider for s > sθ and
g > gVθ , the case where seller Y sets βY = 1 and picks αY ∈ [α̂, 1] randomly, where
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α̂ , α(vθ = v̂θ) can be found by substituting (C.1) and β = 1 into (2.3). From the
above analysis, we see that seller Z’s best response is to set βZ = 1 and randomize
αZ ∈ [α̂, 1]. As a result, given s > sθ and g > gVθ , there is a mixed-strategy Nash
equilibrium where both sellers set βj = 1 and pick αj ∈ [α̂, 1] randomly.
Consider now s > sθ and g < ḡ
III
θ . In this case, seller Z’s best response to
(αY ∈ (0, 1), βY = 1) given αZ < αY is to set αZ = 0, resulting in













We determine that if g < gVθ , then
RZ(αZ = 0, αY > 0, βZ = 1) > RZ(αZ = αY , βj = 1) > RZ(αZ = 1, αY < 1, βY = 1)
and if g > gVθ , then
RZ(αZ = 0, αY > 0, βZ = 1) < RZ(αZ = αY , βj = 1) < RZ(αZ = 1, αY < 1, βY = 1)




θ , we conclude that if s > sθ and
given g < ḡIIIθ , seller Z’s best response to (αY ∈ (0, 1), βY = 1) is (αZ = 0, βZ = 1).
Consider then (αY = 0, βY = 1); seller Z’s best response is either (αZ > 0, βZ = 1)
with profits equal to RZ(αZ = 1, αY < 1, βY = 1), or αZ = 0 resulting in
RZ(αj = 0, βj = 1) =
1
2
((p1 − c) + (s− p1)p1 + g(p2 − c)(1− p2)(1− p1)) .
We see from above that RZ(αj = 0, βj = 1) > RZ(αZ = 1, αY < 1, βY = 1) if s > sθ
and g < ḡIIIθ ; in other words, both sellers’ best response to the competition providing
no information and offering full refund is to provide no information and offer full
refund. This result leads us to a Nash equilibrium where both sellers provide no
information and offer a full refund return policy, (αj = 0, βj = 1), in case of s > sθ
and g < ḡIIIθ .






θ . Therefore, if
g < gVθ , then we have g < ḡ
III
θ readily satisfied, and following the analysis above,
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seller Z’s best response to (αY ∈ [0, 1), βY = 1) is (αZ = 0, βZ = 1). As a result,
(αj = 0, βj = 1) is the only Nash equilibrium if s < sθ and g < g
V
θ .
Given s < sθ, suppose g > g
V
θ ; then, seller Z’s best response to (αY = 0, βY =
1) is (αZ > 0, βZ = 1). In other words, both sellers’ best response to the competition
setting (αj < 1, βj = 1) is to provide more information than the competition,
and therefore due to symmetry, there is no equilibrium where both sellers have
(αj < 1, βj = 1). Consider then (αY = 1, βY ∈ [0, 1]); seller Z’s best response is
either (αZ = 0, βZ = 1) with RZ(αZ = 0, αY > 0, βZ = 1), or (αZ = 1, βZ ∈ [0, 1])
with RZ(αj = 1). Comparing the profits, we find that if g < g
V I
θ , seller Z’s best
response to (αY = 1, βY ∈ [0, 1]) is (αZ = 0, βZ = 1), and if g > gV Iθ , then it is
(αZ = 1, βZ ∈ [0, 1]), where
gV Iθ ,
2s− c− p1(1− p1 + c)
(2− p1)(p2 − c)(1− p1)
.






θ . Therefore, if s < sθ and
gVθ < g < g
V I
θ , seller Z’s best response to (αY = 1, βY ∈ [0, 1]) is (αZ = 0, βZ = 1),
to which seller Y ’s best response is (αY = 1, βY ∈ [0, 1]). We conclude that, if
s < sθ and g
V
θ < g < g
V I
θ , there is a Nash equilibrium where one seller provides
full information and offers an arbitrary return policy, while the other seller provides
zero information but offers a full refund return policy.






θ ) and g
V I
θ <
g < gIVθ . We know from above that if g < ḡ
III
θ , then seller Z’s best response to
(αY = 1, βY ∈ [0, 1]) given αZ < αY is (αZ = 0, βZ = 1), and therefore her overall
best response for gV Iθ < g < ḡ
III
θ is (αZ = 1, βZ ∈ [0, 1]). Furthermore, we know
that if g > ḡIIIθ , then seller Z’s best response given αZ < αY is (αZ / αY , βZ = 1),
and therefore for ḡIIIθ < g < g
IV
θ , her overall best response to (αY = 1, βY ∈ [0, 1])
is (αZ = 1, βZ ∈ [0, 1]). To sum, if s < sθ and gV Iθ < g < gIVθ , seller Z’s best
response to (αY = 1, βY ∈ [0, 1]) is (αZ = 1, βZ ∈ [0, 1]). In other words, if s < sθ
and gV Iθ < g < g
IV
θ , there is a Nash equilibrium where both sellers provide full
information and offer arbitrary return policies.
Finally, if s < sθ and g > g
IV
θ , we have g > ḡ
III




and as shown above, there is a continuous series of best responses where both sellers
unilaterally deviate from an equilibrium. As a result, if s < sθ and g > g
IV
θ ,
there is no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the duopoly. On the other hand,
there is a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium where both sellers set βj = 1 and pick
αj ∈ [α(vθ = v̂θ), 1] randomly.
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